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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE DEATH OF THE FLYING WING : THE REAL REASONS
BEHIND THE 1949 CANCELLATION OF
NORTHROP AIRCRAFT'S RB-49
By

Francis J . Baker
Claremont Graduate School : 1984
In an interview aired over the Public Broadcast i ng
System in 1980 , aircraft manufacturer John K. Northrop made
a stunning charge.

Referring to the Air Force's 1949 can-

cellation of his Flying Wing aircraft, Mr. Northrop alleged
that the cancellation was not the result of any valid
concerns about the aircraft itself, but rather was a
retaliation for his refusal to agree to aB improper demand
by the Air Force .

Specifically, Mr. Northrop charged that

then-Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington ordered him
to merge his firm with Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, and that when he refused, an 88 million dollar contract for the Flying Wings was cancelled.

Mr. Northrop also

admitted that in 1949 testimony before the House Armed

Services Committee, he had perjured himself by denying that
Mr . Symington had ever threatened or retaliated against
Northrop Aircraft, Incorporated .
This dissertation began as a study of ethics and decision-making in the military procurement process.

However,

in-depth research revealed no improprieties in the Air
Force ' s Flying Wing acquisition program.

Research tech-

niques included careful study of voluminous Air Force
records , most housed at Edwards Air Force Base, California , and at the Air Force Historical Research Center in
Mo ntgomery , Alabama .

These documents, once secret but now

declassified, showed that military decision- makers were
never sat isfied with the Nor throp plane, and regularly made
their position clear to Northrop .

The author ' s document

searches were augmented by a series of interviews held with
as many of the surviving participants as possible:

Senator

Symington, who vehemently denied any impropriety ; Gen .
Curtis E . LeMay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Co mmand
(SAC), who readily admitted that he never wanted the
Northrop plane and argued against it (and for the competing
B-36 bomber) before a board of senior Air Force officers
just before the cancellation; Gen . Lauris 0 . Norstad, the
sol e surviving member of tha t seni or off icer' s board, who
vigorously rejected any suggestion of improper behavior by
Senator Symington in this or any other procurement decision.
An interview with the cur ren t Cha irman of the Board of
Northrop corporation, Thomas V. Jones, generally supported

Senator Symington, and clarified the stand of today's
Northrop management .

In addition, the author interviewed

and corresponded with the two Air Force chief test pilots on
the Flying Wing; both men gave valuable insights into the
technical performance of the Northrop aircraft.
If political manipulation was not the cause of the
1949 cancellation, what was?
factors that were involved .

The research uncovered four
First was the substantial

improvement in the competing B- 36, which made great strides
in late 1948.

Second was the assignment of General LeMay as

SAC commander in October 1948; unlike his predecessor, Gen eral LeMay was a strong backer of the B-36, and was willing
to give up other weapon systems ( l ike the Flying Wings) to
get more of the Consolidated-Vultee B-36s. Third was
President Truman ' s cuts in the Fiscal Year 1950 defense
budget, which caused the Air Force to not only defer the
addition of eleven planned combat units, but also to
eliminate eleven others (of a total of fifty-nine) already
in existence.

Finally, the shortcomings of the Flying Wing

were certainly numerous and significant enough to argue
against its production and procurement.
After refuting a number of the allegations made in the
1980 broadcast, the dissertation concludes with some impli cations for management . Chief among these is the need to
maintain a marketing orientation , that is , the requirement
to emphasize what the customer requires , rather than what
the producer wants to build .

The Flying Wing was Mr .

Northrop ' s lifelong dream, and the author argues that its
production was more related to what Mr . Northrop wanted to
build than to what the Air Force needed to acquire .
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PREFACE
The reader will soon notice that the perspective of
this dissertation tends to be an Air Force one .

The view-

point of the Northrop participants has been extensively
reported, not only in the 1980 interview of Mr. Northrop and
his associates, but in other forums as well.

This disserta-

tion will cite the numerous books and articles that have
been written about the Flying Wings : most are unabashedly
pro-Northrop, and do not present the Air Force side of the
controversy .

Likewise, some of the participants, most

notably Mr . Northrop and his test pilot Max Stanley, have
actively spoken out on behalf of Mr . Northrop's position :
those speeches have not always looked objectively at all
facets of the Flying Wing program.
By contrast , the Air Force viewpoint has been largely
ignored .

This dissertation is an attempt to uncover those

previously overlooked perspectives, through a scientific
study of the available evidence.

Previously classified Air

Force documents tell of the many serious concerns which
motivated the military decision-makers.

Interviews with

many of the surviving Air Force leaders, and with both of
the Air Force ' s Flying Wing test pilots, provide corroborating evidence.

In addition, comments by current Northrop

Corporation management lend support to the dissertation's

ix

conclusions .

The combination of these sources provides a

complete history of the Flying Wing program .

X

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PREFACE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION

. . . . .

.

. . .

. .

vii
ix

. . . . . . . . . .

1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

II .

BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS: 1928-1944 .

11

III .

BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS : THE XB-35
IN THE POST-WAR YEARS . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

THE YB-49: THE FLYING WING BOMBER IN THE
JET AGE . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . ·

34

THE RECONNAISSANCE VERSION OF THE FLYING WING :
THE YRB-49
. . .
. . . . . . . . .

52

CANCELLATION OF THE RB-49 PROGRAM .

67

RESPONSES TO MR. NORTHROP ' S STATEMENT : SENIOR
AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP AND CURRENT NORTHROP
MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

Chapter
I.

IV .
V.
VI .
VII.

VIII .
IX .
X.

THE CHARGE

TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE FLYING WINGS : THE
AIR FORCE PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . .

102

"THE FLYING WING--WHAT HAPPENED TO IT?": A
CRITICAL REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

116

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

129

BIBLIOGRAPHY . .

. . .

. .

. .

xi

. .

. .

. . .

. .

. . .

144

INTRODUCTION
December of 1980 saw the airing of an interview over
the Pub lic Broadcasting System which r e opened a controversy
which had been dormant for thirty years .

In the interview,

John Knudsen Northrop, a n aircraft designer and man ufactur er, charged that his successful "Flying Wing " aircraft
desi gn had been cancelled in retaliation for his refusal to
knuckle under to demands by the Secretary of the Air Force
that he merg e his firm with a larger, more favored aviation
conglomerate .

For some in the aviation industry, the

interview merely conf irmed long-held beliefs ; others saw it
as a shocking revelation about governmental power plays ; a
few thought it was a one-s ided , biased slam at a distin guished public servant , who in his career was the first
Secretary of the Air Force , a United States Senator , and
even , for a while , a candidate for the Democratic
presidentia l nomination in 1960 .
This dissertation started as a study of ethics in
manager ial de cis ion-maki ng, a study of a weapon sys tem
acqu is ition gone awry, a good aircraft design abruptly
ter mina ted by a political power play.

The cancellation had

long term effects: for e x ample , NASA recently confirmed the
design as an eff icient one for a cargo trans port , and the
shape is also the basis for the highly- classified " stealth "

1
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aircraft, expected to be invisible to radar .
Some dissertation studies take unexpected turns as the
research unfolds, and this is one of them.

My research has

shown that the cancellation of the Northrop Flying Wing was
neither arbitrary nor political, but based on a number o f
valid considerations.

In addition, there was one man who--

perhaps more than any other - - was responsible for the choice
of the Convair B-36 bomber, and the resulting cancellation
of the Northrop Flying Wing.

But he was not the man accused

by Mr. Northrop; instead , he was the man who was then the
Commander of the Strategic Air Command, and who would have
had to use whichever bomber was selected .

The results of

extensive interviews with him and others involved in the
decision were among the considerations which led me to alter
my original ideas.
If political chicanery was not to blame for the death
of the Flying Wings , what was?
the lessons of marketing.

The answer can be found in

We will see that such basic

marketing precepts as the need to focus on the customer,
emphasize product utility, and be aware of buyer behavior,
never seemed to enter the realm of Northrop's selling
efforts .

Rather than being guided by what the customer

needed , Northrop focused on the product it wanted to
produce, and then tried to push that product on an unwilling
buyer .
An unusual topic, fraught with charges and countercharges , with some participants no longer alive and events

3

covering thirty years and more , requires an unusual format .
In the first chapter I will recount, in some detail, the
charges made by Mr . John K. Northrop , and corroborated by
his Chairman of the Board, Mr. Richard

w.

Millar .

In the

next several chapters, I will discuss the history of the
Flying Wing programs , and also the relationship of those
programs to the competing B-36 .

Following chapters will

deal with what I believe will show to be the real reasons
for the cancellation.

Finally, after a chapter which

counters many of the claims made in the Public Broadcasting
System documentary, I will conclude with implications for
management and marketing derived from the Flying Wing
experience .

CHAPTER I
THE

CHARGE

In October of 1979, reporter Clete Roberts of the
Public Broadcasting System station KCE T-TV interviewed John
K. Northrop, founder of Northrop Aircraft Corporation.
Fourteen months later, after delays generated by the need to
gather additional material and by a postponement request
from Mr . Northrop, the interview was aired as a KCET
documenta ry entitled "The Fl ying Wing--What Happened to
It? "

1

What Mr. Northrop had to say in the interview re-

opened what for many of those involved was an emotional
issue that had remained dormant for more than thirty
years .

2
In the fil med interview , it was quite clear that the

then 85-year-old Mr. Nort hrop was not in good health .

His

appearance was frail, his eyes watery, and his voice
halting .

But the viewer was left with the feeling that Mr .

Northrop's mind was still sharp and his convictions strong ,
and he presented his case clearly a nd forcefully, as he to ld
Mr. Roberts of the 1949 cancellation of his lifelong dream ,
the Flying Wing .

Because of the significance of Mr .

Northrop ' s charge , his statement deserves to be quoted at
length :

4
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Well, it's a very strange story and perhaps diffi cult to believe, but it certainly is seared into my
memory, and I'm quite sure I can give you the
absolute facts as they occured .
. The same.d~y that ~en3ral McNarney who was the
ch~ef--the m~l~tary ch~ef --of the Air Forces, came
to my office with that additional order for thirty five airplanes, which he said was a drop in the
bucket as far as the ultimate order was concerned,
Mr. Millar and I were requested to visit Mr.
Symington . At that meeting, he lectured us rather
lengthily on the difficulties of a Secretary for
Air in keeping things in hand, and told us that he
did not want to sponsor any new aircraft companies
entering the business and having to be supplied with
business over the years, and that he wanted us without question to merge with Consolidated Vultee, which
was then operating a government-owned plant in Fort
Worth, building the B-36, as a competitor to the
B-35 or B-49 [Northrop's Flying Wing bombers] .
After the lengthy diatribe on Mr . Symington 's
part, I said , "Mr. Secretary, what are the alternatives to this demand you're making of our merger
with Consolidated Vultee? " He said, "Alternatives?
You'll be goddamned sorry if you don ' t !"
General McNarney said, "Oh , Mr. Secretary , you
don ' t mean that the way it sounds," and Mr. Symington
said, " You ' re damned right I do! "
Well, this was a ~ather staggering termination
of the meeting . . . .
Interviewed for the same broadcast, Richard W. Millar,
who in 1948 had been the Northrop Board Chairman, corroborated Mr. Northrop ' s story:
We were in effect directed to negotiate or work out
a merger with Northrop and Convair . Jack Northrop
asked the question , "What if we don't merge? " and Mr.
Symington was quick to reply that we ' d " be damned
sorry if we didn't ." We were told to get together
with Mr . Odlum to work out a basis for the merger.
I might say parenthetically that when Mr . Symington
said in effect that we must do it, and we ' d be sorry
if we didn't, General McNarney spoke up and he said ,
as I recall , " Mr . Symington, you don ' t mean that , do
you? " and Mr . Symington sa~d in effect that, "Yes ,
you're damned right I do . "
The merger allegedly demanded by Mr . Symington never
came about .

Mr . Northrop and Mr. Millar both indicated that
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they visited Floyd Odlum, then President of Convair's parent
company, but that talks broke off because the two sides
could not agree on terms .

According to Mr. Northrop, it was

shortly after the merger talks broke off that he received a
telephone call from Mr . Symington :
I got a telephone call a few days later from Mr .
Symington. He said, " I am cancelling all your Flying Wing aircraft . " And I said , " Oh , Mr. Secretary,
why? " And he said , "I've had an adverse report ,"
and hung up . That was the last time I ever talked
to him , and the l ast ti~e we could ever reach him by
phone or any other way .
Mr. Northrop went on to claim that the money which was
to be used to purchase the Flying Wing then went instead to
Convair, and was used to purchase more copies of the rival
B-36 .
MR . ROBERTS: Did he give the contract to someone
else?
MR . NORTHROP : He continued the construction of the
B-36 by Consolidated Vultee in Fort Worth .
MR . ROBERTS: So , in fact, the contract was taken
fro m you , and given t o Consolidated because you had
refused to merge with Consolidated, as you were
ordered to do by t he government, is that accurate?
MR . NORTHROP : That is abso lutely accurate . 7
The picture painted by Mr . Northrop, and corroborated
by Mr . Millar, is one of a rash and seemingly corrupt
decision , made all the more brutal by the way the judgment
was handled .

But if Mr . Northrop believed he was unfairly

treated , why did he testify otherwise at a 1949 House Armed
Services Committee investigation?

When asked by Mr . Joseph

Keenan, General Counsel to the Committee, whether Mr .
Northrop believed there were political implications in the

7

Flying Wing cancellations , he answered in a strong manner :
MR . NORTHROP : I believe there were none .
conceive of there being any .

I can't

MR . KEENAN : And you make that statement under oath
before this committee?
MR . NORTHROP : I do, sir .
MR . KEENAN : Genuinely believing it?
MR . NORTHROP : I certain l y do .
MR . KEENAN : And not because you are in fear of
reprisals?
MR . NORTHROP : No sir, I am not in fear of reprisals.
But persistent rumors about forced mergers between
Convair and other manufacturers caused the Committee Counsel
to press further .

A few minutes later , Mr . Northrop was

questioned yet again by Mr . Keenan :
MR . KEENAN : Have you any knowledge that either yourself as president or any officer or anyone else connected with Northrop Corporation being informed [sic]
that unless Northrop agreed to merge with Consolidated
that business would be bad for Northrop?
MR. NORTHROP: I have no such knowledge .
MR . KEENAN : Has anyone ever said anything from which
you could draw such an inference?
MR . NORTHROP: No , si r.
MR. KEENAN : Specifically did Mr . Odlum ever say that?
MR . NORTHROP : No, he did not .
MR. KEENAN : Or Mr . Symington?
.
9
MR . NORTHROP : No , s1r .

So in 1979, thirty years after his dramatic 1949
testimony, Mr. Northrop changed his story, contradicting his
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sworn statements before the House Armed Services committee.
Mr . Roberts asked Mr . Northrop about his reaction to his
1949 testimony, in light of his 1979 reversal .
MR . NORT~ROP : My reaction is that, under pressure
of t~e l1fe or death of Northrop Corporation, I
comm1tted one of the finest jobs of perjury that
I've ever heard .
MR. ROBERTS : You did not tell the truth .
MR. NORTHROP : I did not tell the truth .
MR. ROBERTS : And the reason for doing that was .
MR . NORTHROP : The rea son for doing that was fear of
the Secretary-- the Air Secretary, Mr. Symington-fear of his complete obliteration of Northrop Aircraft Corporation .
MR . ROBERTS : How does it happen, Mr . Northrop, that
for thirty - one years this story has not been told?
MR . NORTHROP : The reason . . . is the same as the
reason for my initial perjury, and it was the fear
. . . that any intima tion of this circumstance would
result in a r8mplete cancellation and obliteration of
the company .
Once again , Mr . Millar was able to corroborate Mr .
Northrop ' s story :
. . . the meeting with Mr . Symington was so , sha l l I
say , brutal . . . barefaced . . . so obviously , if
you will , a powerpla y that you almost had to assu me
that he would be prepared to take further ste~I if
we didn ' t go as good boys and go along . . . .
Mr . Roberts claimed that he tried to contact former
Secretary Symington , and offered him an opportunity to
respond to the charges of Mr . Northrop and Mr. Millar.

Mr .

Roberts said that Secretary Symington declined , sayi ng
only--through his secretary--that he " never did that sort of
.
11 12
th 1ng.
With General McNarney and Mr. Northrop now dead , Mr.
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Millar refusing any further comment, and Senator Symington
silent until now, the reasons for the cancellation have
remained a source of disagreement.

Reporter Clete Roberts

acknowledged this in his emotionally charged conclusion:
The question might properly be asked, "How much has
military aviation in America been set back by the
destruction of the 'Fl ying Wings'?" One has the
feeling that only the surface has been scratched in
the story of the B-49 'Flying Wing' . The disturbing
fact remains that a revolutionary aircraft design
was apparently short- circuited in the development
program of American aviation , a design that, in the
words of NASA, has only recently been rediscovered,
and might well represent the next form of large
cargo aircraft.
There are overtones of politics and
big business power plays that appear to have affected the product of the genius of John Knudsen
Northrop. The B-49--the i[l ying Wing'--now little
more than a memory . . . .
Summary
The charges were dramatic , and it appeared that Mr .
Symington elected to refrain from a strong , on-camera refutation.

But this dissertation will show that, for what-

ever reasons, Mr. Northrop's charges have the effect of
trying to make a very complex situation overly simplistic,
and the KCET documentary did not help to clarify the issue.
There were unquestionably valid concerns which contributed
to the cancellation of the Flying Wing, not one of which was
even mentioned in the KCET-TV i nterview.

Later chapters

will address each of those contributing concerns, but first
it is necessary to cover the lengthy and complex history of
the Northrop Flying Wing program .
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS : 1928-1944
The Northrop Flying Wing bombers did not suddenly
burst forth, fully developed in the late 1940s.

Rather , the

Wings had their roots in developmental programs begun twenty
years before , eventual l y growing from small, wooden test
aircraft to the giant, eight-jet YB-49 that would awe the
aviation industry just after the Second World War.
Like all developmental aircraft, the early Flying
Wings suffered from their share of problems.

It is signi-

ficant, though, that unlike other programs in which the
"bugs " are eventually corrected , the flaws affecting the
Wings were most persistent .

In fact, this chapter will

highlight several problems plaguing the early Flying Wings ,
problems that caused cancellation of most of the B-35
bomber production program in 1944, and which would haunt
the subsequent YB-49 effort in the Post-War years .
Genesis
The saga of the Northrop Flying Wings began in 1928 ,
when his desire to experiment with radically new aircraft
designs led John Knudsen Northrop to leave the Lockheed
Aircraft Company , and to form his own corporation .

His new

firm--Avion Corporation of Burbank, California-- began to

11
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experiment in a number of areas, including the study of all wing designs.

This led to the fabrication of the very first

Northrop Flying Wing, which made its maiden flight at
Burbank in 1929 . 1
This first Flying Wing was not actually an all-wing
aircraft , since stability requirements demanded that
Northrop include two outrigger-type booms which connected to
t h e tail control surfaces .

Northrop explained that he saw

the half-radical, half - conventional design as a necessary
evil : " We didn't dare go the whole way and eliminate the
tail. "

2

But, as with the giant Wings which would follow

in the next two decades , the crew compartment, engine , and
fuel tanks were buried within the Wing's thirty - foot, sixinch span .
The prototype Flying Wing , identified as "X 216H ", made
a number of flights in 1929 and 1930, most at Muroc Dry
Lake , California .

(Muroc would later be renamed Edwards Air

Force Base, in honor of an Air Force test pilot killed in a
1948 crash of a Flying Wing bomber.)

But while the X216H

program was a technical success, it was soon sidetracked by
.

t h e Great Depresslon .

3

United Aircraft and Transporta-

tion Corporation absorbed Northrop's Avion (renaming it
Northrop Aircraft Corporation) in 1929, and by 1932 was
pushing for a merger between Northrop and United ' s Stearman
Aircraft subsidiary in Kansas .

John Northrop balked at the

idea of a merger, just as we will see that he did again
sixteen years later, and broke with United, forming a new

13

Northrop Corporation .

But as before, Northrop was a small

part of a larger enterprise ; this time, the controlling
force was Douglas Aircraft, which owned fifty-one percent of
Northrop stock . 4
During the 1930s , Northrop developed a number of new
aircraft designs.

New Flying Wing concepts were studied,

but no new aircraft of the type were built .

In 1938 ,

Northrop's dependence on Douglas was underscored when his
corporation was again renamed, this time changing from the
Northrop Corporation to the El Segundo division of Douglas
Aircraft .

Within a year, Jack Northrop pulled out of

Douglas Aircraft entirely, starting still another new firm :
Northrop Aircraft, Incorporated .

Total employment stood at

six : Northrop himself was president, as well as head of
.
.
eng1neer1ng
an d researc h . 5

But he was on his own--free

to experiment and innovate , free to design his own aircraft
rather than produce someone else ' s components.

And one of

the first designs to emerge was a new and more radical version of X216H: the N-1M Flying Wing .
The N-1M
The N-1M (which stood for

~orthrop-Model

l

~ockup)

6

started life not on the drawing board of an aeronautical
engineer , but in a completely different--and far less conventional--environment :
The N-1M . . . was built in wooden mockup form which
made possible many changes in shape during the testing processes . One major problem was how to obtain
directional stability, and how to get the effect of
fins and vertical surfaces without actually having

14

them protrude from the wing surface .
The answer took shape when Mr . and Mrs. Northrop
were guests of Moye Stephens, then the company's
secretary, at the latter's ranch home one rainy weekend. The group was unable to take a planned hike,
because of the weather, so stayed indoors and experimented with paper airplanes.
These paper models at first were in the conventional schoolboy's pattern, but later were folded
into shape much like that of the Flying Wing . Tips
of the wings were bent up and down and with each
change the paper planes were "flown". Soon it was
found that a downward bend of thirty-five degrees
gave the best performance . . . . This seeming
child ' s play actually resulted in valuable data and,
later at the plant, was put into practice. 7
Tests in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
wind tunnel confirmed the effectiveness of the drooped
wingtips, and they were incorporated in the full-scale
aircraft .

8

In May of 1940, the completed N-1M was painted bright
yellow, and then secretly trucked by night from Hawthorne to
the Army Air Corps test base at Muroc.

The first flight

came two months later on July 3rd, and the exact circumstances of the flight are still somewhat in question .
Official Northrop documents are in accord with this comment ,
made by company test pilot Max Stanley in 1980 :
On July 3rd, it accidentally made its first flight.
The pilot, Vance Breese, while making a high speed
taxi run, hit a rough spot on the lake bed . The
airplane bounced about ten feet in the air, flew
straight and level for a few hu~dred yards, and then
settled back onto the lake bed.
But another report tells a somewhat different story, a
story which hints that perhaps not everyone fully shared Mr .
Northrop's faith in his design :
. . . the magazine Time reported that " it looked
like a ruptured , weath er-racked duck , too fatigued
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to tuck in its wings." Pilot Vance Breese tried
taxying [sic] and then, on July 3, cautiously lifted
off and held the yellow wing as close to the ground
as he could--as someone said, " to make the crash a
bit easier . " Northrop's comment was, "It looks like
we have an airplane with a twenty-foot ceiling.
" 10
Whether the first flight of the N-1M was accidental or
merely prudent, the aircraft went on to complete an extremely successful flight test program.

There were no serious

accidents, and, with the exception of engine cooling
problems, no major technological difficulties .

In more than

two hundred flights, pilots Breese and Moye Stephens explored the whole design envelope of the N-1M, including
stalls and spins, and in so doing proved the Flying Wing to
11
. .
d es1gn.
.
b e a va l ua bl e and prom1s1ng
The First Flying Wing Bombers: The XB-35
With the all-wing principle validated by the successful test program of the N-1M, Jack Northrop turned his
attention to larger aircraft.

On May 21 , 1941, he wrote a

Confidential letter to Col. Howard Z. Bogert of the Army Air
Corps Materiel Division at Wright Field.

In the letter , Mr.

Northrop first raised the prospect of a l arge Flying Wing
bomber:
. we have made very successful and encouraging
flights of the flying mockup (N-1M) and I believe
the time is here ~hen we can s7rious~y c2~sider
building bomber a1rcraft to th1s des1gn .
Just two days later, Mr. Northrop again wrote to
Colonel Bogert, saying that the performance specifications
had been clarified by a visit from Brig . Gen. Oliver P .
Echols, Commander of the Air Materiel Command:
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General Echols indicated that a high speed of 400
mph and a bomb load of 5,000 pounds was what was
desired, wit~ all additional performance we might be
able to ~bta2n to be devoted to increasing the range
of the alrplane . . . . We believe we could carry
between 10,000 and 15,000 pounds of bombs for 5 000
miles . . . . However, we have made no accurate ;ange
studies whatsoever as yet , s~ r would not want to be
quoted on the above figures. 3
Just four days l ater , the Air Corps formally solicited a design study from Northrop for a Flying Wing bomber
capable of the followi ng performance levels : 14
Minimum

Desired

5 , 333

6 , 000

Maximum Speed (mph)

400

450

Average Speed (mph)

250

300

35 , 000

45 , 000

Range (miles)

Ceiling (feet)

On September 12 , 1941 , Mr . Northrop responded, offering to sell the Air Co rps one Flying Wing bomber (by now
designated the XB-35) for $2,870,000 .
could be built for $1 ,5 50 , 000 .

He said a second

The first aircraft could be

completed within twenty-four mo nths of contract approval ;
delivery of the seco nd could be negotiated later. 15
On November 1 , 1941 , a contract was formalized , with
Northrop providing one XB - 35 bomber, plus a wooden mockup
and flight data information , for a total price of
$2,910 , 000 . 16

But almost immediately , problems arose .

Northrop had never built an aircraft the size of the XB - 35,
and on December 1, 1941, the corporation notified the
Assistant Chief of the Materiel Division that they were
facing a serious capacity problem .

Wh ile a seco nd XB-35
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could be assembled within five months of the first, space
constraints at the Hawthorne plant were such that there
could be no assembly line .

In fact, there was not even room

to assemble a single XB-35, unless Northrop went ahead and
built a new structure for that purpose .

Even that proposed

building would only handle one bomber at a time : assembly of
subsequent aircraft could not begin until the previous one
17
was complete .
This proved to be a crucial problem :
similar space constraints would plague Northrop throughout
the decade, and would prove to be one of the factors which
ultimately contributed to the Flying Wing ' s demise .
Just six days later , though, the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor gave new impetus to the Flying Wing program .
On December 12 , the Air Corps ordered the second XB-35 . 18
Six months later, the wooden mockup of the XB-35 was ready
for review by the Air Corps Experimental Engineering Sec tion ; because it was so revol u tionary and so highly class ified , British members a s sig n ed to the American team were not
allowed to take part in the inspection of the mockup . 19
But by later in 1942, the XB - 35 - -like other projects -was tangled in a confusing web of national priorities.
Shortages of resources --especially engineering talent- - were
threatening to cause long delays in a number of aircraft
programs .

Attempts were made to get increased resources

applied to the XB - 35 effort , thus freeing the XB-35 from
th i s entanglement , but the e f forts were unsuccessful .

On

September 28 , 1942 , the Deputy Ch i ef of the Air Staff wrote
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to the Commanding General of Materiel Command, General
Echols:
Highest priority should be given research and de velopment activities for these particular projects
[XB-35, and Convair's competitor XB-36] by the Air
Cor~s , w~th particular reference to Northrup [sic]
eng1neer1ng personnel . . . . An attempt should be
make.to secure AAA pr ior ity from w . ~ B. [War Product1on Board] for these airplanes . 0
The Commander of Materiel Co mmand responded , describ ing the hectic wartime environment, in which the shortage of
men and materiel contributed to the long delays that would
prove characteristic of both the XB-35 and XB-36 programs :
The very highest priority possible has been given to
the Northrup [sic] XB - 35 . . . . Efforts have been
made and are still being made . . . to borrow engineers from other manufacturers on the West Coast to
assist Mr . Northrup [sic] . To date no success has
been had . . . . There is a definite shortage of
engineers in the industry and in the Materiel Command . Practically all projects have extremely high
priority . Whenever an endeavor is made to expedite
any project , it results i~ delay of some other project of highest priority. 1
By November, t hough, help was on the way .

The Air

Corps decided to cancel a contract with the Glenn Martin
Company for design and production of 402 B-33 bombers .

The

Air Staff directed thet " the B- 33 will be abandoned immed iately and the engineering talent engaged thereon will be
.
transferred to the XB-35 and XB- 36 proJects
. " 22
But General Echols of Materiel Command was aware that
the engineering shortage was only part of Northrop's
problem .

He understood all too well that even with the

transfer of Martin ' s eng ineers to Northrop, the space constraints at Hawthorne still would make mass production
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infeasible .

Therefore, General Echols decided to give

Martin the right to build the Flying Wing bombers, by converting Martin's B-33 contract to YB-35s .

In a note added

to the Confidential Air Staff memo abandoning the B-33, General Echols wrote:
I have issued instructions to Wright Field . . . to
start procedure to convert B-33 contracts to B-35 .
I have taken this matter up with Mr. Martin personally and his representatives are now at the Northrop
plant in Calif .
O. P . E . 23
The theme of this memo from General Echols is central
to the whole Flying Wing story: because Northrop did not
have the capacity for quantity assembly, the Air Corps had
to turn elsewhere for the actual production runs .

In this

case, the beneficiary was the Glenn Martin Company.

Six

years later, the situation would arise again , with Convair
taking on production of the XB-35's successor, the jet-powered RB-49 .

In both cases, the underlying cause was the

same: Northrop was simply incapable of producing the Flying
Wing bombers in the quantities required.
Five days after the General Echols memo , the Air Corps
notified Northrop that the B-35 would be built by Martin at
its Baltimore plant.

24

By December , 1942, Materiel Com-

mand had decided the specifics : Northrop could build one
hundred B-35s at Hawthorne, while Martin built another hun25
.
d re d at Ba l tlmore.
too much for Northrop.

But even the hundred B-35s were
On December 28, 1942, General Echols

was informed that Northrop did not want to participate in
any production beyond the experimental and service test
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craft :
Northrop has been contacted and indicates that with
their facilities as now existing, they will be unable to fabricate more than the XB [experimental]
and YB [service test] type airplanes already on contract, ~nd ~sked that they be relieved of th2 load
of fabr1cat1ng these additional one hundred . 6
The entire order of two hundred B-35s was then shifted
to Martin , which was able to promise an eventual delivery
rate of forty aircraft per month . 27

But the joint ven -

ture between Northrop and Martin proved ineffective .

By May

1943 , Martin halved the projected peak delivery rate to
twenty planes per month, and acknowledged that even that
rate could not be reached until September 1945 . 28

Other

problems being faced by Martin were brought to the attention
of Materiel Command .

On May 18, 1943, Martin told the Com-

manding General of Materiel Command about Northrop-directed
changes in the XB-35 ' s aluminum skin: "We wish to bring out
this information in order that you may fully realize the
unknowns that we are facing in the manufacture of this air plane ." 29

More months of b ickering between Martin and

Northrop followed, until in August 1943 Martin notified Air
Materiel Command that it wanted to be released from the B-35
project:
Due to the uncertainties surrounding this project
and due to the existing doubts as to whether the
airplane is now ready for production, it seems impr~per.to incur ~Brther production expenditures at
th1s t1me . . . .
In the meantime , a one-third scale model Flying Wing - called the N- 9M--was undergoing wind tunnel and flight test ing , and the disappointing r esults had reached Washingto n .
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Chief of Army Air Forces General H. H. " Hap " Arnold wired the
Commanding General of Materiel Command on Nov e mber 24, 1943 :
Latest information indicates that the XB- 35 range
has dropped off 1600 miles, and high spe ed has dropped twenty-four miles below previous estimates. Detailed . information is desired, especially insofar as
range 1s concerned . . . .
In view of this latest
disappointment[,] request you present opinion as to
t~e ~erits of the XB - 35 and the desirability of Ion tlnUlng the present extensive production plans . 3
By early 1944 , the e n tire XB-35 progra m was in serious
trouble .

Northrop coul d n ' t produce the aircraft in quan -

tity , the Martin Company was unhappy in its role as producer
of another firm ' s design, and the entire project was far behind schedule .

The XB - 35 was still years away from its

first flight, and now data based on its flying scale model
N-9M showed that performance would be far below expectations .

In August of 1941 , the Materiel Command had nearly

doubled the required range of the XB-35 to ten thousand
miles .

But in January 1944 , a Materiel Command memo esti -

mated the XB - 35 ' s range wit h a ten-thousand-pound bomb load
at only 5200 miles .

While this was a significant improve-

ment over the then-operational B- 29 , it fell far short of
•
•
t s . 32
the Army A1r
Force 1 s requ1remen

There were still othe r problems .

One of the N-9M fly -

ing scale models had crashed in May 1943, killing the pilot ,
and subsequent investigation pointed toward dangerous and
mysterious handling characteristics at low speeds .
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Then the Martin Company-- brought in to bring engineering
help to the project--i tsel f became short of engineers , and
had to borrow 350 draf ts men fr om the Otis Elevator Company .
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Martin estimated that this would delay the first B-35
delivery until at least 1947. 34

Soon thereafter, Martin

lost even more engineers to the Selective Service draft.
Finally, in an undated, handwritten memo, General Echols, by
that time Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, officially
killed the production aspect of the program with which he
had struggled for so long :
Prepare a memo to Chief of Air Staff recommending
that due to the additional delay .
. ~e cancel the
production contract with Martin . . . . 3
In 1941, Northrop had said that the first XB-35 could
be delivered in November of 1943, i . e . , twenty-four months
after the contract was signed. 36

But by May 1944, the

best estimate for the XB-35's maiden flight was August
37
1945,
and Martin couldn't deliver the first production
B-35s until 1947.

38

While much of the problem was be-

yond the control of either Northrop or Martin, the combination of long delays and changing wartime requirements led
the Air Staff to agree that at least the production contract
for two hundred B-35s should be terminated .

On June 3 ,

1944, a terse letter from a low-ranking contracting officer
to the Martin Company made it official :
The Government no longer requires the articles
called for under subject contract ~nd haj 9 therefore
terminated the same for its conven1ence .
Northrop was permitted to continue work on the two experimental (XB) and thirteen added service test (YB) models ,
but all plans for large scale production were scrapped.
Those fifteen XB and YB models, though, would form the core
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of the post-war Flying Wing bomber program, and would lead
to perhaps the ultimate Flying Wing : the eight-jet YB-49 .
Summary
In essence, the Flying Wing bomber programs can be
classed in two eras .

The first, running through all of

World War II , was characterized by the development of the
propeller-driven XB-35 .

The second era began with the first

XB-35 flight, and would continue through the test program of
the jet-powered YB-49 and YRB-49.
We will see that both programs were unsuccessful, and
for remarkably similar reasons .

First, aircraft stability--

in serious doubt after the 1943 crash of the N-9M--proved to
be an equally significant problem in the post-war program .
Second , Northrop • s lack of plant capacity- -the cause of the
whole Martin Company involvement--proved equally crippling
during the the YB-49/YRB-49 development .

Finally , aircraft

pe rfor manc e , especial ly range, was disappointing in the
XB-35, and would be far more troubling with the YB-49 .
These factors , all part of the cancellation of the B-35s,
would play equally critical rol es in the 1949 cancellation
of the RB-49 .
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CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS
THE XB-35 IN THE POST-WAR YEARS
Although the Army Air Force cancelled quantity production of the B-35s , work continued at Northrop on the
limited number of experimental (XB} and service test (YB}
airplanes.

Finally , on June 25 , 1946, the first XB - 35 took

to the air--near l y three years behind schedule 1 and at a
cost nearly five times the original estimate . 2
Flight Test
The f i rst flight--from Northrop Field to Muroc - -was
uneventful, and largely trouble-free. 3

But that was to

be the first and l as t trouble-free flight for the XB - 35.
For the rest of their existence, the XB- and YB - 35s would be
hampered by a seemingly endless succession of problems , most
of which , i ronically , were not directly associated with the
Flying Wi ng configuration itself .
The most critical and persistent problems with the
XB - 35 were related to the gearbox and propeller systems .
Each of the four Pratt and Whitney R-4360 engines drove two
sets of four propeller blades , each set rotating in a different direct i on .

Northrop test pilot Max Stanley summed u p

the troubles in a 1980 speech:
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It was plagued with problems from the very beginning
of the program . . . propellers which would fail to
govern, or would not feather, and if they did feather,
they would not unfeather . The driveshaft would develop unacceptable vibration . The gearbox would
overheat. Each of these malfunctions resulte~ in
program delays, some of which were extensive .
The XB-35's problems were at least as serious as Stanley's
speech indicated, and perhaps more so.

One of the first

test flights ended with both engines on the same side shut
down because of propeller failure, and for a time the XB-35
was grounded while a solution was sought . 5
But that solution proved elusive .

Pratt and Whitney,

the engine manufacturers, blamed the propeller fabricators,
Hamilton Standard , for oil leaks and materiel failures.
Hamilton Standard , in turn , blamed Pratt and Whitney as
well as Northrop, claiming that both firms had been warned
that problems would be almost unavoidable in the giant 8bladed props . 6

Hamilton Standard and Pratt and Whitney

were sister companies : since the mid-1930s , both had been
subsidiaries of the United Aircraft Corporatlon. 7
0

Bu t

their close relationship apparently did not make it any
easier for them to solve the XB-35 ' s propulsion problems.
Because of the unusual amount of stress involved, Air
Materiel Command determined that the maximum life of the
propellers was only eighty h ours , so that--assuming an
average operational flight of eight hours- - all the
propellers would have to be scrapped after every tenth
flight . 8

This was obviously unacceptable, as were the

continuing propeller failures : the ninth test flight of the
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XB-35 suffered another gearbox failure, and the tenth flight
ended with the XB-35 limping home on two engines, again due
to prop failure . 9

Search for Solutions
It was becoming clear that the propeller fiasco was
causing a critical bottle neck in the entire B- 35 program .
The second XB-35 was near l y complete , and the remaining
service test YB-35s were in work as well , but the propulsion
problems threatened to keep the entire fleet grounded indefinitely .

In February 1947, a meeting was held at Wright

Field to try to solve the problem :
Due to engineering difficulties and materiel fail ures encountered in dual rotation gearbox and propeller installations in XB-35 airplanes, investigation has been conducted to determine the most feas ible method of obtaining flyable B-35 airplanes at
an early date . . . .
It was determined that single
rotation gearbox . . . would enable the first XB-35
to fly [again] at the earliest possible date . . .
Hamilton Standard personnel were ~ery pessimistic
about the dual rotat i on program . 1
Following this meeti n g , some of the dual rotation b u gs
were ironed out , and both XB - 35s--for a time--kept their
counter-rotating props .

But further purchases of all such

equipment were cancelled , and the remaining service-test
YB-35s were scheduled to be fitted with single rotation
propeller systems . 11

By early 1948, even the two XB-35s

had been retrofitted to the single-rotation configura.
12
t 1.on .

But the simpler single- rotation propellers also proved
unsatisfactory .

Max imu m speed--one of the Flying Wing's
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unique strengths--was reduced, 13 dealing yet another
blow to the B-35 program .

Northrop pilot Max Stanley ex-

pected the simple props to be ineffective, and was proven
correct.

As he recalled in 1980:

Finally, almost in desperation, the dual rotating
propellers were removed and replaced with a single
four-~lade propeller .
As expected, these propellers
were 1ncapable of absorbing and delivering the full
power of the engines resulti~g in an unacceptable
degradation in performance .
Air Force test pilots agreed .

In March, 1948, when

John Northrop suggested that a publicity program be set up
to break current world records with his Flying Wing bombers,
the Air Force declined .

The then-current record holders--

primarily the P-80 fighter (for speed) and B-29 bomber (for
distance)--had been well-tested before their record-breaking
attempts, the Air Force reasoned.

But pilot reports on the

XB-35--even with the new propeller arrangement--had been
extremely negative, pointing out that the new configuration
had resulted in lower performance and higher levels of vib ration , both on the ground and in flight .

As a result, Air

Materiel Command recommended that both the XB-35 and its
jet-powered successor , the YB-49, be subjected to further
testing before any record-breaking attempts were made. 15
The endless B-35 problems were fast causing Air Force
interest to wane.

At a conference on August 16, 1948,

Materiel Command and Northrop representatives met to discuss what to do with the eleven YB-35s, none of which had
yet flown .

The group came up with four alternatives , two

involving storing the B-35s unti l better engines came along
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(at a minimum additional cost of 2.5 million dollars) ; the
other two choices called for immediate conversion of YB-35s
to jet-powered B-49s (at an additional cost of 2.923 million
dollars) . 16
But just three days later, an Air Staff letter to Air
Materiel Command killed all four of the above options .
Northrop was to be notified that no more money would be
allocated to produce B- 35s ; Northrop was to take the avail able funds and use them to deliver a maximum number of
YB-35s to the Air Force ' s Strategic Air Command for opera.
1 test1ng
.
t1ona
. 17

But a week later, on August 27, 1948,

Air Materiel Command replied that there were not enough
funds to turn over even a single YB-35 to SAC, because of
unsatisfactory propulsion and exhaust systems .

There were

enough funds for preliminary flight tests of one YB-35 , but
the others would need to be either scrapped or stored . 18
The demise of the XB/YB-35 program meant that
Northrop ' s hopes for a successful Flying Wing bomber would
have to rest on a variant of the B-35 , the jet-powered
YB-49s .

Those aircraft, only two of which would ever be

built, would now represent the future of the Flying Wing
bomber .
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CHAPTER IV
THE YB-49: THE FLYING WING BOMBER
IN THE JET AGE
Toward the end of World War II, the aviation world
began to experiment with jet propulsion.

The Germans intro-

duced the twin-jet ME-262 fighter to the skies of Europe
with considerable effectiveness, 1 while American efforts
focused on the less successful P-59 jet fighter . 2

By

1945 it appeared that the future of jet propulsion was
assured .
Against this backdrop, the Army Air Force and Northrop
agreed in June 1945 to experiment with a jet-powered Flying
Wing bomber .

To minimize the development time required, it

was determined that two of the original thirteen YB-35 service airplanes already on contract would be modified to jet
propulsion .

The new airplanes would be called YB-49s. 3

The YB-49s were almost identical to the YB-35s in all
but the propulsion system.

The four R-4360 engines with

propellers that had caused so many problems for the XB-35
were to be replaced by eight TG-180 jet engines, each with
just 3750 pounds of thrust .

4

Substantial vertical fins

were added for stability, replacing the engine housings and
propeller shafts, and two of the eight bomb bays were converted to fuel tanks to feed the thirsty jet engines .
34

5
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The YB-49 program acquired new significance when it
became apparent that the B-35 propeller problems might never
be fully solved .

In May of 1946, Air Materiel Command saw

the YB - 49 as a potential savior for the entire Flying Wing
program :
In view of the high propeller blade stresses and the
elastic gearbox mounting difficulties presently being encountered on the XB-35 airplane, it appears
that the YB-49 might offer a desirable alternate
power plant installation in the e v ent a satisfac5ory
solution to the above problem cannot be reached .
The AMC memo went on to describe the other principal
benefit of the YB-49: speed .

Its projected top speed was to

be 465 miles per hour , versus 391 miles per hour for the
XB-35.

The differential in cruising speed would be even

greater : 400 miles per hour for the YB-49, against only 240
miles per hour for the XB-35.

But all this performance was

not without its price: range with a 20 , 000 bomb load was expected to drop from 4175 miles to about 3500 .

7

Despite the generally encouraging figures , all realized that the YB-49 was not an optimal design .

By the ti me

the YB-49 was completed in October 1947, the authoritative
magazine Aviation Week noted the fact that while its fuel
consumption was four time s that of the XB-35, the extra bomb
bay fuel tanks meant that range had been cut "only a little
more than half . " 8

While the short range was of concern ,

it was attributed to the fact that the YB-49 was a jet-age
modification of a propell er-era airframe.
gineer wrote :

A Northrop en-
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The YB-49 airplane was originally conceived as a
purely experimental jet- powered version of the
XB-~5 . The existing XB - 35 structure was to be
rev1sed . . . . only as necessary to allow the installatlon of ~he TG - 180 engines and required extra
fuel capacity .
And the Air Materiel Command agreed :
Although the YB - 49 has obvious limitations, primarily
d~e to the fact that it is a modification , it is conSldered that the ~irpl ~5e will be extremely valuable
as a research proJect .
Shortcomings as a Bomber
Its characterist ics may have made it a satisfactory
research project , but it appeared that the YB-49 would be
totally inadequate as a bomber .

It had only six bomb bays :

bays #1 and #8 on the XB-35 were converted to fuel tanks on
the YB-49 .

Like the XB-35, the largest bomb which could be

carried was 4000 pounds ; larger standard Air Force bombs of
12,000 and 22 , 000 pounds could not fit at a11 . 11

In -

credibly , the YB -49 , l ike the XB-35 , could not even carry
the atomic bomb .

12

These shortcomings were well-recog-

nized as early as 1946, and elements in the Air Staff were
skeptical even then that the YB-49 would ever develop into
an adequate bomber :
If procurement were initiated for the B- 49 , it
would not reach tact ical units before other bombers
of the same class having equal performance and with
provisions for carrying the A-bomb . Therefore it is
felt that unless the B- 49 can be modified to carry
the atom bomb , further procurement is unwarranted . 13
F light Tests
Despite these reservations, work continued on the
two YB-49s, and the first was successf u lly flown from
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Hawthorne to Muroc on October 21, 1947. 14

The first

flight was uneventful, according to the test pilot Max
Stanley, who stated in 1980 that the YB-49 program was far
less troublefilled than that of the XB-35 :
The YB-49 flight test program was as trouble-free
as the XB-35 was troublesome . All test objectives
were met on or ahead of schedule . The airplane
proved to be sim~~e to fly with no special pilot
skills required.
But other records paint a much different picture .
first flight did go according to plan. 16

The

But on the

YB-49's second flight, the nose gear door blew off, and the
nose landing gear would not lower .

Through a hastily-

convened radio conference , Northrop engineers were able to
work with the pilot to get the landing gear down. 17
Other problems existed as well: for example, constant- speeddrive generators, designed to provide electrical power for
the YB-49, were deleted by government order, and replaced by
auxiliary power units.

These units, called APUs, failed

frequently , first during tests and later in flight, and
filled up three of the six bomb bays as well.

18

Despite these and other problems, the YB-49 test program did seem generally more successful than that of the
XB-35 . Northrop and the Air Force traded pats on the back,
congratu l ating each other for having had the wisdom and
fortitude to see the Flying Wing bomber program through the
difficult XB-35 days .

On December 19, 1947, Northrop wrote

to Gen . carl A. Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff:
You are well acquainted with the continuing pr~blems
concerning reduction gear and propeller operat~on
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t~at have kept the B- 35s virtually grounded for
e1ghteen months since the first one was flown to
Muroc.
Fortunately we have had better luck with
the first jet-powered YB-49, and have been able to
get almost as much time in two months with jets as
was secured in eighteen months on the two XB-35s.
As chief of the USAF, I am sure you will be
happy to know that our best expectations concerning
performance are being fulfilled . . . .
In other
words, the project has already been proven highly
successful . . . . You can definitely uncross your
fin~ers I~ncerning the value and success of the
proJect.

General Spaatz' comments on January 8 , 19 48, were less enthusiastic and more reserved than Mr . Northrop's .

General

Spaatz closed by saying :
All of us have been keenly disappointed over the
failure to obtain adequate flight data from the
XB-35s . We realize that your company is not at fault
in this failure.
The conclusive data which can be
obtained by continued, intensive flig~ tests with
the YB-49 is [sic] anxiously awaited . 0
Materiel Command Reservations
If General Spaatz appeared to be hedging a bit on the
Flying Wing bomber concept , he had very good reason.

An in-

ternal Air Ma teriel Command memo , dated the day before General Spaatz ' response , reflected the serious concern AMC had
regarding the in-flight stability of the YB-49:
This section does not believe that adequate information or analysis has been made to thoroughly.
evaluate the probabil i ty of success of the Fly1ng
Wing . . . the two unknown s which must be thoroughly evaluated before undertaking another wing air plane are as follows :
a.
b.

Inherent stability or artificially induced
automatic pilot stability at cruising speeds
(affecting the stable bombing platform) .
High speed stability . . . . This second.problem cannot be minimized because an a11-w1ng
airplane . . . will have all the problems
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a~sociated with swept wings without the bene-

flt of long tail lengths to assist in the
solution of those problems . 21
Even Max Stanley agreed that stability was indeed a problem :
A more serious shortcoming was revealed by flight
tests which indicated that the YB-49 had very low
~aw damping with oscillations extending over a perlod of as long as 10-12 seconds . This was a serious
deficiency in the stability of the airplane and cast
a dark shadow on thz 2 suitability of the aircraft as
a bombing pla t form .
So at this point the Air Force had a bomber with inadequate range , and which was incapable of carrying t h e
atomic bomb--or even large conventional bombs , for that
matter .

In addition , the airplane tended to be unstable in

flight , and yawed so much from side to side that accurate
bombing results were thought to be unlikely .

Still , despite

all the Air Force • s qualms, Northrop continued to lead the
cheers for the Flying Wing bombers :
Flight tests compiled to date on XB-35 and YB-49
airplanes have fully conf irmed expected high performance of those airplanes, as well as the fact
that they have features of stability and contro lability renderin ~ 3 them entirely satisfactory for
bombing missions.
Tests of Range
For a time in the early part of 1948 , the YB-49 • s
future began to brighten .

The second YB-49 made its maiden

flight on January 13, and soon joined its partner in flight
tests at Muroc . 24

Distance tests in April led to are -

cord- setting flight , in which a YB-49 stayed aloft for more
than nine hours , covering more than three thousand miles enroute from Muroc to San Francisco to Phoenix and back to
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Muroc.

While this was a record endurance for jet aircraft,

and while it was accomplished with one engine shut down for
part of the flight, it was only about one-third of the original ten thousand mile specification laid out for the
Flying Wing bomber in 1942 . 25

Still, the results were

encouraging enough that the new Air Force Chief of Staff ,
Gen . Hoyt S . Vandenberg , wrote to Mr. Northrop on May 12,
congratulating him on t he successful test flights . 26
Disaster
On June 5 , 1948 , Maj . Daniel Forbes and Capt. Glen
Edwards, along with three other crewmembers, were scheduled
to take up the second YB - 49 for what should have been a
routine test flight .

In the nearly five months since its

maiden flight, the second YB-49 had flown twenty-seven
times, for a total of about sixty-six hours in the air .

The

first twenty-four flights had been under the control of
Northrop , but on June 4 , the YB-49 was transferred to the
Air Force.

Three fl igh ts on the day of transfer totalled

nearly eleven hours, and the fourth Air Force flight was
scheduled for the next day, June 5th .

27

The YB-49 took off from Muroc at 5:44A . M. , and
reported twenty- six minutes later, over Bakersfield ,
California .

At 6 : 33A . M., the crew, by then over the north

end of the Antelope Valley , reported decending through
fifteen thousand feet .
YB-49 crew .

That was last ever heard from the

At approximately 7 : 03A . M., the bomber was seen

to fall, tumbling from the sky north of Muroc .

28
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Only a few people witnessed the crash, and by the time
they saw the aircraft, it was already tumbling out of control.

One eyewitness was Maj . Russ Schleeh , an Air Force

fighter test pilot whose career would later become closely
entwined with the remaining YB-49 :
I was en route to the North Base from the Muroc Main
Base by auto when something attracted my atte n ti on
on the west side of the road on which I was traveling . At first it appeared to be falling pieces of
metal.
Probably it was the outer wing panels or
control surfaces that caught my eye .
I then glanced
north and noticed the main section of the airplane
tumbling and later contacting the ground just north
of the Mojave-Victorville highway .
I rushed to the
scene after scanning the sky for parachutes and
rummaged around the wreckage but could not identify
anything of consequence due to the impact damage and
result~9g fire and total destruction of the aircraft .
There were no parachutes : all five men aboard the
YB-49 were killed.

Muroc was later renamed Edwards Air

Force Base in honor of the copilot Edwards.

But like many

events surrounding the Flying Wing program, exactly what
happened on that June morning is a matter of dispute .

Max

Stanley, in his 1980 speech , did not even mention the crash ;
he alluded only briefly to the YB-49 ' s " reputation as an
airplane with unacceptable stall characteristics, " areputation he claimed was not deserved .

30

The official

Northrop history implies that the crew simply exceeded the
design limits of the airplane , perhaps descending at too
high a speed . 31

Ed Maloney, in his not-always-unbiased

book, Northrop Flying Wings, makes a similar suggestion:
" It is assumed that . . . the ' not to exceed ' limits of the
aircraft were exceeded while descending from 40 , 000 feet ."
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Maloney admits, though, that this is speculation, and that
"what exactly happened is not known . " 32
But Air Force records, while they do not point conclusively to the cause, indicate that the problem wasn't a
result of the highly experienced crew simply going too fast.
Rather , the records point, albeit inconclusively, toward an
accident which resulted from a stall, the same maneuver Max
Stanley said was so safe , but a maneuver which records show
Air Force pilots were apparently reluctant to even attempt .
Two days after the crash, Northrop Engineering Test
Pilot F . C . Bretcher dispatched a memo to Northrop head quarters in Hawthorne .

Bretcher wrote that , although his

information was not to be considered final, he had learned
the agenda for the fatal test flight .

Takeoff was to be

followed by a climb to forty thousand feet, when " speedpower runs ," i . e ., how much power was required to reach a
given airspeed, were to be conducted.

The crew was to

gather data on exhaust tempera tures , and then shut down and
restart two engines .

The final event was to involve one

stall , probably at ten thousand - fifteen thousand feet .

33

Since the last radio call from the crew was at fifteen
thousand feet and descending, and since the crew reported no
problems at that time , it seems reasonable to conclude that
the disastrous loss of control probably happened during the
stall tests.

But that last radio call was at 6 : 33A .M . , and

the crash did not occur until 7 : 03 , a half-hour later .

One

stall shouldn 't take thirty minutes; if the Bretcher memo
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was correct, what else was the crew doing in addition to
that single stall?
A later Air Force document suggests the answer .

Lt.

Col . Frank J . Collins, in an official statement in the
records of the crash probe, confirmed most of the Bretcher
memo .

However , there was not just one stall on the

schedule , as Bretcher had thought .

Rather , a whole series

was to be accomplished , at progressively higher power
settings : " If the airp l ane p r oved to handle clean l y during
these stalls , stalls with higher power settings were to be
obtained ."

This clearly implies that there was a lot yet to

learn about the stall characteristics of the YB-49.

What

did Forbes and Edwards , e x perienced Air Force test pilots,
think of the stall tests in the YB-49?

The Collins memo

continues : " It is known that the pilot was reluctant to
attempt the higher power stalls ."

34

So , the June 5 c r a sh probably occurred while the crew
was attempting a ser ies of sta l ls , each one at higher power
settings than the l ast .

Fu rther , the stalls were t h ought to

be dangerous enough that a n experienced Air Force test p ilot , a man not unaccustomed to risk , was reluctant to perform them.

The comments of Northrop pilot Stanley--that the

stall characteristics of the YB - 49 were acceptable- -seem to
be contradicted by these documents , and by the tumbling air plane that fell out of the sky on a sunny June morning in
1948 .
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Aftermath
Surprisingly, the crash did not kill the YB-49
program.

The surviving YB-49 was grounded for inspection

and some modification, but was later reentered into the
flight test program .

In the meantime, Convair's giant B- 36

bomber had run into problems, and the Air Force had decided
to stop production at the ninety-fifth aircraft.

But the

B-36 plant at Fort Worth was twice the size of the Northrop
plant and it was government-owned .

The Commanding General

of the Air Materiel Command decided that it was necessary to
keep the Fort Worth plant operating, and if the B-36 could
not be continued, another bomber would have to be substituted.

AMC decided to try to convince the Air Staff to

build the B-49 in quantity.

On June 17, 1948--just twelve

days after the fatal crash--Gen. Joseph T. McNarney wrote to
the Air Force Chief of Staff recommending purchase of fif teen B-49s per month, most of which would be built at Fort
Worth, by Convair through a subcontract arrangement with
Northrop.
This was a most extraordinary letter.

No mention was

made of the crash, nor was there any indication that the
Strategic Air Command, the ultimate user of the bomber,
supported the request.

General McNarney based his recom-

mendation solely on the need to keep the Fort Worth plant
open, and suggested that the money for the B-49s come from
cancellation of thirty North American B-45 bombers per
month. 35
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The Air Staff was not convinced.

While they agreed

that cancellation of North American's B-45 was a good idea,
they strongly disagreed wi th the notion of building more
B-49s , at Fort Worth or anywhere else.

In addition to the

fact that the recent crash indicated that the YB-49 obviously required more testing, the Air Staff pointed out that its
short range classed the YB - 49 as a medium bomber, and the
Air Force already had enough medium bombers .

General

McNarney ' s recommendation was turned down . 36
More Flight Test Problems
The Air Staff decision was later validated by further
tests .

In addition to all the previous shortcomings of the

YB - 49 as a bomber , tests in November 1948 showed that the
YB-49 was incapable of even performing a satisfactory bomb
run.

The test pilot, then-Major Robert Cardenas, was quoted

as stating the plane was " extremely unstable and very diffi cult to fly on a bombing mission . . . continual yawing
made it impossible to hold a steady course or a constant airspeed and altitude . "

Bomb runs took four times as

long as similar runs with a B-29, and accuracy was only half
as good .

Air Materiel Command recommended that the YB-49

stay at Muroc until aerodynamic problems were fixed , and
that until that time , the YB-49 was believed to be unsuitable for either bomber or

.

reconna~ssance

wor k . 37

November 16, 1948, marked the effective end of the
YB-49 program .

On that date, Brig . Gen . K. P . McNaughton,

Acting Di rector of Training and Requirements , wrote to

46

Gen . Muir S . Fairchild, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff .

In

the memo General McNaughton stated that there was no longer
any requirement for the B- 49 bomber .

It was already infer-

ior to Boeing's new B- 47, which had topped six hundred miles
per hour in testing, and would soon be competing against the
B-52, expected to be even better than the B-47 .

General

McNaughton recommended tha t the B-49 be droppect . 38
By February 1949 , th e decision had been made .
surviving YB-49 wo u ld cont i nue flight testing .

The

Another

YB-35 would be modified to a reconnaissance version, and
three more YB-35s would be turned into flying test beds for
various purposes .

All other Wings would be scrapped, saving

the Air Force approximately $7,500 , 000 , when compared to the
cost of completing production on all the aircraft in progress.39

On October 28 , 1 949 , the Air Force finally

cancelled most of the remaining program : only the YB - 49,
permitted to contin ue f light test , and the YRB-49 , the
reconnaissance co nversio n , t h a t had not yet flown , sur.

VlVe

d • 40
Epilog
The second YB - 49 continued in the flight test program .

In April , 1949 , a new chief Air Force test pilot was brought
in.

The man chosen had previously served as Chief of Fight-

er Flight Test at Wright Field : Maj . Russ Schleeh, the same
Russ Schleeh who had been an eyewitness to the Forbes/
Edwards crash nine mon th s before .

41

on March 15 , 195 0, t h e r ema i ning YB - 49 was destroy e d
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in a taxi accident .

Once again , the cause of the crash was

a matter of disagreement .

The Northrop history blamed the

Air Force pilot, claiming that Major Schleeh had tried to
turn the nose wheel at too high a speed :
. . . this same airplane was destroyed one year
later (March 15, 1950) during an excessively highspeed turn while taxiing on the runway at Edwards
Air Force Base. The nose gear collapsed, flipping
the airplane cow~letely over. All of the crew escaped unharmed.
But once again , the Air Force perspective was different .

According to the military records, the real cause was

a failed or unserviced "shimmy damper," a device which controls the tendency of a nose gear to wobble .

This interpre-

tation is backed up by crash photos, which show a long
sinuous streak of rubber , with the oscillations becoming
worse just before the gear finally collapsed.

From the

Edwards Air Force Base history :
A stability test to determine the nose gear liftoff speed at forward cg [center of gravity] was being conducted on the dry lake bed when a violent
nose gear shimmy was encountered near lif t-off speed .
The vibration became so severe as to cause failure of
the nose gear strut . The fuel leaks and subsequent
fire . . . resulted in destruction of the aircraft .
All personnel were able to leave the airplane, al though the pilot, Major R. E . Schleeh, and engineer ,
C~ptain M. . F~ench , ~o th of the AMC Flight Test Divi 4
Slon were ln)ured.
Thus the destruction of the sole surviving YB-49 ended
the story of the Flying Wing bombers.

Only one aircraft re-

mained--a reconnaissance model called the YRB-49--and it had
not yet flown when the second YB-49 crashed at Edwards .

But

it would f ly two months later , and it would come to repre sent still another strange aspect of the Flying Wing story .
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CHAPTER V
THE RECONNAISSANCE VERSION OF THE FLYING WING :
THE YRB-49
So far , our review of the Flying Wing bombers has
shown that only fifteen airframes were ever ordered from
Northrop, and that the orders for those fifteen were all
placed by 1942 .

We have seen that for a number of reasons ,

including range , stability, and bomb carrying capacity ,
serious doubts existed within the Air Force as to the suitability of the XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wing bombers .
But we have also seen Mr. Northrop ' s claim that the
Air Force placed another order for thirty-five aircraft in
1948 .

This order , if it existed as Mr . Northrop claimed ,

would be significan t , since it would suggest that the Air
Force ' s reservations about the Flying Wing bombers had at
last been overcome .

Mr . Northrop described the order

clearly in his 1979 interview:
General McNarney, who was ~he Chief of.the.Air
Force, walked into my off1ce one morn1ng 1n
late June of 1948 and said, "You have won the
competition . Here is an order for thirty-five
additional aircraft " and I took a deep breath
and said , " Oh, that's wonderful" and he said,
" That ' s only a drop in the bucket . We probably
will need between tw~ hundred and three hundred
of these airplanes ."
Northrop test pilot Max Stanley confirmed that a 1948
production contract for Flying Wing bombers was given to
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Northrop:
The Air Force furnished a bombardier who arrived at
Muroc with the then highly secret Norden bomb sight.
After evaluating the results of a lengthy series of
bomb drops under varying conditions, the aircraft
was accepted by the Air Force as a satisfactory
bombing platform, and a production contract was
awarded Northrop by the A~r Force .
It was, however,
a controversial decision.
Despite the fact that both Mr. Northrop and his chief
test pilot agreed that a production contract for Flying Wing
bombers was awarded in 1948, Air Force records show no such
order.

In fact, Air Force documents show clearly that no

Flying Wing bombers were ordered from Northrop after the
fifteen experimental and service test airplanes were ordered
in 1941 and 1942 .
crepancy?
faulty?

What, then, is responsible for this dis-

Were the memories of Mr. Northrop and Max Stanley
Or are the surviving Air Force records inaccurate

or incomplete?
The answer is really neither .
placed in 1948 .

There was an order

The number of aircraft ordered was not

thirty-five, as Mr . Nort h rop recalled , but thirty , and the
planes were not to be bombers: the Air Force was at that
time apparently still convinced that the Flying Wings were
not going to prove satisfactory as bombers .

Instead, the

Air Force reasoned that if the YB-49 was too unstable and
unusable as a bomber, perhaps it could be adapted to
another role .

This line of reasoning dovetailed well with

the Air Force's search for a long-range reconnaissance air craft , and it was those , not bombers , that the Air Force
finally ordered in 1948 .

The airplane came to be called the
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YRB-49

("YRB" indicating that it was to be a test version of

a reconnaissance modification of a bomber design) and it
developed into another unusual chapter in the story of the
Flying Wing's development .
The Need for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft
In a letter dated Ma r ch 12 , 1946, Gen . Carl A. Spaatz ,
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces , outlined the mis sion of a newly established combat force:
The Strategic Air Command will be prepared to conduct long range offensive operations in any part
of the world, either independently or in coopera~ion with land and.naval forces ; to conduct max4
1mum range reconna1ssance over land or sea . . .
But SAC ' s ability to carry out "maximum range recon naissance over land or sea" was pretty doubtful in the late
1940s .

By 1948, SAC ' s entire reconnaissance force consisted

of just fifty-eight aircraft, nearly all of which were relatively short-range RB-17s or somewhat more capable RB - 29s.
Both of these aircraft were designed prior to World War II;
neither possessed the capab i lities that SAC needed .

5

On April 12 , 1948 , a meeting was convened at Wright
Field , the purpose of which was to determine which of three
aircraft was best capable of meeting the reconnaissance requirements of the Strategic Air Command .

At that meeting ,

Considerable discussion followed as to which air craft , the F- 12, FDC - 6 , or FB [later RB]-49 could
best meet the overall technical requirements .
In
addition , consideration was given to the respective
manufacturer's capa b ility and contemplated work load . . . It was agree d that the FB [RB] - 49 showed
the greatest possibilities for development and in
its interim stages c ou ld most realistically

55

accom~lish a p~rt~on gf the overall strategic reconnalssance m1ss1on .

The conferees went on to recommend that the FB/RB-49 be
procured in three stages , based on Northrop ' s projected im provements .

The first group of aircraft would be powered by

eight relatively primitive jet engines; while it could be
available by January of 1950, it would have only about half
of the desired ten-thousand-mile range .

The second batch of

airplanes would have only six jet engines , but they would be
more powerful than those in the previous model .

Range would

improve to 5,640 miles, but the delivery would have to wait
until December of 1950.

Waiting still one more year, until

late 1951 , would allow the development of the third and
ultimate version of the RB-49 .

This would use two jets and

two gas turbine power plants, which would theoretically
combine to achieve a range of 9,320 miles .

7

This proposed three-stage purchase of the RB - 49 was
not an optimal solution .

The Air Force felt that the range

of the first version was insufficient, but apparently
believed that the improvements projected for versions two
and three would raise performance up to acceptable levels:
Although the range of the first version of the
[R]B- 49 was realized to be inadequate, subsequent
versions of the aircraft , equipped with different
engines, were expected to show considerable improvement .
All in all , the [R]B-49 appeared at
the time to be the most promising of the different
airplanes available for strategic reconnaissance
purposes . 8
on May 3, 1948 , the Air Force notified Northrop of the
.
9
decision to buy thirty of the RB - 4 9 s, vers1on one :
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Contractor is advised that the AMC [Air Materiel
Command] anticipates procuring thirty FB[RB]-49
airplanes incorporating eight J-47A engines . . .
Min imu m delivery schedule as follows :
1949 December
1
1950 January
1
February
2
March
2
April
3
May
3
June
3
July
3
3
August
September
3
October
3
November
3
But the Air Force let Northrop know that a three
aircraft/month schedule was not considered satisfactory :
Above schedule has been quoted as contractor ' s best
schedule, however USAF considers ear lier availability
of FB[RB]-49A production airplanes ma nda tory . There fore contractor is requested to dete rmin e how TBch
t ime could be gained by all-out ove rtime
. .
The Air Force, though , didn ' t have a clear picture of
the problem.

The slow delivery schedule was due less to the

shortage of labor than to the same plant capacity problem
that had plagued Northrop for the entire decad e .

By late

1948 , Northrop still had only about 1 . 2 mill ion square feet
of plant space, only about 20 percent of Convair's 5 . 8
million square feet . 11

Thus the three deliveries per

month rate was about all that the Hawthorne plant could
support .
Impetus of Berlin
In the spring of 1948 , the Air Force apparently felt it
could live with the three planes-a-month schedule.
summer , though, things had changed .

After months of

By the
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increasing tension, the Soviets blockaded the city of Berlin
on June 24 .

The questionable combat readiness of the

Strategic Air Command received new attention as President
Truman ordered deployment to Europe of ninety SAC bombers
and additional reconnaissance aircraft. 12
Renewed emphasis on SAC meant renewed emphasis on the
reconnaissance procurement effort .

Suddenly, more aircraft

were thought to be needed , many more than Northrop could
deliver .

The industry magazine Aviation Week commented on

the Air Force ' s increased needs, and on Northrop ' s inability
to satisfy them :
Northrop's productive capacity of only three
bombers per month at its Hawthorne, California
facilities cannot meet the accelefjtion of the
program desired by the Air Force.
A week before the mounting tensions in Germany culminated in the Berlin Blockade , General McNarney, Commander
of Air Materiel Command , had recommended to the Air Staff an
accelerated rate of fifteen RB-49 aircraft per month.

Since

Northrop could only produce 20 percent of those, General
McNarney recommended that the remainder be built at the
government-owned , Convair- operated plant at Fort Worth,
which was then turning out the B-36 intercontinental bomber .
This arrangement would provide a dual benefit: first, the
increased production could be used by SAC to more quickly
upgrade its strategic reconnaissance force .

Second, the

scheme would allow the Fort Worth plant to keep operating
after the ninety - fifth (and expected to be last) B-36 was
completed . 14
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The Air Staff, feeling that the Flying Wing was still
unproven, disagreed with General McNarney's proposed boost
in production, but did (with the apparent approval of
Secretary of the Air Force Symington) authorize the transfer
of RB-49 production to the soon-to-be-idle Fort Worth
factory .

In a letter to General McNa rney, Gen . Hoyt

s.

Vandenberg , Air Force Chief of Staff , clearly indicated his
concern about the continuation of Fort Worth production , and
al l uded to a possible increase in RB-49 procurement:
. you are authorized to arrange for the transfer
of FB [RB]-49 production from the Northrop plant to
the Fort Worth plant in order to continue production
upon expiration of the B-36 contract and to provide
for adequate production facilities fgr current and
future production of the FB[RB]-49.
On June 30, 1948, General McNarney notif ied both
Convair and Northrop of the decision :
It is the desire of the Air Force to retain the
production facilities at Fort Worth which is now
employed in the construction of B-36 airplanes .
Since it is not intended to buy more than the
ninety - five B-36 airplanes presently on contract,
it is desired that the production of RB-49s be
moved to that facility at the earl i est possible
date.
An absolute minimum number of RB-49s will
be built at the present Northrop facility at
Hawthorne . . . It is requested that representatives of Northrop Aircraft and Consolidated Vultee
Aircraft arrange t~e necessary plans.for carryi~g
out this program w1th the least poss1ble delay .
General McNarney's letter was perhaps a classic in
bureaucratic miscommunication .

In this single communique,

he completely recast an $84,000 , 000 contract, and told two
competitors to simply work out the details between themselves . . . quickly .

But the "details " were staggering :

did the General mean that Northrop should take over t he Fort
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Worth plant?

Or did he mean that Northrop should just turn

over its designs , its tools, and its expected profits to
Conso l idated Vultee?
Fort Worth plant?

Just who was to be in charge in the

Exactly how were the profits of the joint

venture to be allocated?
The record shows that the McNarney letter was as ambiguous to Northrop and Convair as it appears in retrospect
thirty - five years later .

On July 9, 1948, John Northrop

wrote back to General McNarney : Northrop management had met
with Convair officials, he explained, but the meeting had
not been productive .

Northrop had understood General

McNarney ' s letter to mean that Convair would simply vacate
the Fort Worth plant , turning everything over to Northrop .
Not surprisingly, Convair understood nothing of the kind:
they construed the McNarney letter to mean that Northrop
would merely subcontract RB-49 production to them, and that
they wo ul d continue to operate the Fort Worth facility .

Mr .

Northrop asked General McNarney for help i n ironing out the
differences, but at the same time went to great length to
deny any improper behavior by Convair :
Under the circumstances, nothing further can be
accomplished by conversation between Northrop and
Convair concerning the plans for Fort Worth product i o n of the RB-49 airplanes until the desires or
reauirements of t h e Ai r Force are set forth more
sp~cifically . . . This is especially true because
of the friendly relations existing between the
companies and the necessity of maintaining such
relationships in the event that Northrop is to
operate in the Fort Worth plant . . .
It should
be noted that Convair ' s attitude was not arbitrary
or unreasonable .
It was what might be expected
of any business orga nization, based.on ~he l~mited
infor mation availab l e to them at th1s t1me.
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The Merger
To iron out the problems generated by General
McNarney ' s letter, a second meeting was held on July 16,

1948.

The meeting took place in Los Angeles, and was at-

tended by officials of Northrop, Convair, and the Air Force .
Secretary of the Air Force Symington was in Los Angeles to
fulfill a long - standing commitment to speak at the annual
meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences.

He and

his host, Mr. John McCone of President Truman's Air Policy
Commission, invited the Northrop-Convair - Air Force conferees to Mr. McCone's house for a discussion . 18
The group addressed the problem of producing the RB-49
at Fort Worth .

During this discussion , the possibility of a

merger between Convair and Northrop was raised, not by the
Air Force representatives, but by Floyd Odlum, president of
the Atlas Corporation, parent company of Convair.
In the course of the conversation, Mr . Odlum suggested a merger between the Northrop and Consolidated organizations as the best way of combining
the Northrop engineering talent with Consolidated ' s
production know-how . The suggestion seemed reasonable to the Air Force representatives since Northrop was not organized for a venture requiring as
much capital as the quantity production of the
(R]B - 49.
Mr. Northrop was not in favor of a merger at
that time and preferred an interim solution of the
financing problem by subcontracting the production
work to Consolidar9d . This was the solution finally agreed upon .
Mr. Northrop ' s testimony at the 1949 House Armed
Services Committee supports this account .

After acknowledg -

ing that his firm lacked the capacity to handle the increased purchases then being contemplated ,

20

Mr .
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Northrop described the July 16 meeting:
MR . NORTHROP : The conclusion that was arrived at
after very lengthy discussions was that the best
solution to the problem consisted in [sic) Northrop subcontracting the actual construction of a
major portion of this contract to Convair who would
continue to operate the Fort Worth facility .
COMMITTEE COUNSEL : . . . Did you believe that was
the best solution?
MR. NORTHROP: Conside ri ng all factors , yes . Considering Northrop , no . But we felt it was the
right thing to do in view of all the circumstances
that were presented to us . . . .
COUNSEL: Was there any evidence of any politics in
that deal?
MR . NORTHROP : No, sir . . . .
It appeared to us to
be a logical solution to a difficult problem. No
contractor gladly gives up the manufacture of his
own product . We would have much preferred to have
found a solution that would have prevented that resu 1 t. . . .
COUNSEL : One of the prime reasons for taking that
work away from you was to keep the Fort Worth factory busy.
MR. NORTHROP : That is correct.
COUNSEL : And another reason was to be sure you
would get the accelerated output .
MR . NORTHROP : That is correct .
COUNSEL: But what proportion one did bear to the
other in the solution you are unable to enlighten
the committee.
MR . NORTHROP : That was the point I wanted to make .

21

Air Force Questions
While Mr . Northrop testified that he thought the
arrangement was a " logical solution to a difficult problem , "
people in the Air Force had doubts .

On August 16 , 1948 ,
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exactly a month after the Los Angeles meeting, the Procurement Committee of the Directorate of Procurement and Industrial Planning raised two questions concerning the production of RB-49 aircraft :
1.

Why was it necessary to involve Convair at all?

Why couldn ' t Northrop build the planes in the Fort Worth
plant since it was a government-owned facility?
2.

If Convair was to be involved, why were they to

receive only one-third of the profit, while Northrop, who
would only produce one of the thirty planes, was scheduled
to receive two-thirds of the profit? 22
Two days later, Col . George Schaetzel, the Chief of
the Aircraft and Missile Section, Procure ment Division,
answered both questions.

As to why Convair had to be in-

volved, his answer implied that the need to keep the Fort
Worth plant open was the overriding consideration:
It has been determined by HQ USAF that there is a
strategic requirement for building B-49 type airplanes in the Fort Worth facility .
In addition,
since it is contemplated that production of B-36s
at this facility will be discontinued by November
1949 [still 16 months away) it is considered imperative that a large strategic airplane be built at
that facility in order to make use of the plant and
the production organization. . . .
It would be
very difficult to administrate [sic) this contract
and the contract for the B-36 with both Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation and Northrop Aircraft , Inc . , in the Fort Worth facility as prime
contractors . For these reasons, the Secretary of
the Air Force required Northrop Aircraft, Inc . , to
subcontract the major port~on of the th~3ty (30)
RB-49A airplanes to Consol1dated . . . .
Regarding the second question, suggesting that the profit
distribution was too generous to Northrop, Colonel Schaetzel
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also disagreed :
Through the arrangement as directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Consolidated has the
~ppo:tun~ty to maintain their production organlzat lo n lntact and to use the Fort Worth facility.
The a~vantag7 to Consolidated through this arrangeme~t 2~ far ln excess of any fee which might be
pald .
Summary
So , as the summer of 1948 waned, the situation looked
like this : thirty RB-49s were on order , with at least the
possibility of a great many more to be ordered in the
future .

While it was true that all but one of the air-

planes would be built by Convair at Fort Worth, the arrangement seemed to have something for everyone .

Northrop ' s air-

plane would finally be built, and they would receive twothirds of the profit .

Convair would receive one-third of

the profit , and would retain their production organization
and the right to continue operating at Fort Worth .

The Air

Force would be able to get more airplanes faster , especia lly
if the contemplated increase in orders took place , and the
Air Force would maintain operation of a major aircraft
plant .

It seemed to be a solution that gave no one every -

thing they wanted, but which reasonably addressed the conflicting needs of Northrop, Convair, and the Air Force .
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CHAPTER VI
CANCELLATION OF THE RB-49 PROGRAM
As the fall of 1948 arrived, three separate and unrelated events took place, events that would combine to put
the RB-49 program in serious jeopardy .

The first was the

resurgence of the B-36, the giant bomber then being developed and produced by Convair.

The second involved a

change of leadership in the Strategic Air Command, in which
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay replaced the first SAC commander, Gen .
George C. Kenney .

The third and final blow to the RB-49

came not from the Air Force, but from President Truman, who
imposed deep cuts in the Fiscal Year 1950 defense budget .
The RB-49 might have survived any one, or even two, of these
events , but the coincidence of all three proved insurmountable.
Improvement of the B-36
Like its competitor XB-35, the B-36 got its start
before America entered World War II .

The survival of

Britain was in doubt, and American planners saw the possible
need for a bomber capable of reaching European targets from
bases in North America.

Chief of the Army Air Corps Gen.

H.H. Arnold explained the rationale years later, in 1949:
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So it was only normal then that I should call together the.eng~neers in Washington, the designers,
and the sc1ent1sts, and say, ' Now, listen . This is
1940 . We have the B- 29s well started .
It will
come o u t before the war is over . But there is a
next step beyon~ that . And, if unfortunately this
war should cont1nue beyond our expectations, it may
reach a point where we have to send a bomber from
Labrador or from Greenland to the interior of Germany .
I want you fellows to go out now and think
about an airplane, the next step beyond your B-29,
something that will go ten thousand miles, something that will carry a five - ton load and be able to
return to its base .'
And it was the logical t~ing
to do .
It was just a natural development . . .
Thus it was this " natural development " that spawned
both Northrop's XB - 35 and Convair's XB-36 .
proved extremely frustrating .

Both programs

Like the XB - 35 , the XB-36

took nearly five years to make its maiden f l ight , and its
early fl ight test progra m was troublesome .

The first com-

c.

mander of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. George

Kenney ,

had serious misgivings about the B-36, even suggesting on
December 12 , 1946 that the program be halted .

2

Original

performance figures gave the B-36 a range of just 6 , 500
miles , on l y marginally be t ter than Boeing ' s B- 50, a refine ment of the B-29 .

In addition, General Kenney thought the

B-36 was too slow and vulnerable to enemy attack .

3

Gen . Nathan Twining , then Commander of Air Materiel
Command , rejected General Kenney ' s recommendation , and the
development of the B-36 con tinued .

By 1948 , General

Twining ' s faith in the B- 36 had been vindicated: while the
huge bomber was not without its problems, it could do things
that no other airplane could .

It was unsurpassed in its

bomb-carrying capacity : on June 30 , 1948 , a B-36 dropped a
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record 72,000 pounds of bombs in a test .

Six months later,

another B- 36 dropped 84,000 pounds (nearly the entire empty
gross weight of its B- 49 competitor) from an altitude of
4
35-40 , 000 feet .
Maximum altitudes--once a cause of
concern to the Air Force--were also impressive : by the end
of 1948, an experimental YB - 36 had climbed to above 46,000
feet, well above what even the B-36 ' s supporters had thought
possible .

5

Bomb capacity and altitude were important, but the
area in which the B-36 truly excelled was range.

When Gen -

eral Kenney wanted to cancel the B-36 in 1946, the best
estimates of its range were in the 6 , 500 - mile area.

In

April 1948, the first production B-36 flew mo re than 6 ,90 0
miles, with a 10,000 pound bomb dropped at the midpoint of
th e

.

.

mlSSlOn .

6

Improvements soon followed .

The next

month, the same B-36A flew 8,062 miles, despite a malfunc tioning engine .

Six months later , a B-36B flew a simulated

bombing mission from Fort Worth to Hawaii , over 8 , 100 miles
with a 10,000 pound load .

7

The B- 36 was thus proving

itself as the only bomber capable of reaching Eurasia from
bases in the United States, and returning , without relying
on air refueling , which was then in its infancy .
The last remaining concern the Air Force had was
speed, and even that was overcome in the fall of 1948 .

On

October 5 , convair proposed a modification which would add
four jet engines to the six propellers then powering the
B-36A and B-36B.

The result : greater speed over target .
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Top speed would increase from 345 miles per hour (B - 36A} and
381 miles per hour (B - 36B) to 435 miles per hour for the
proposed je t-assisted B-360 .

The added power would also

permit higher (above 45 , 000 feet} operation , with an
increase in weight-carrying ability of almost 30,000
8
pounds .
In all, the latter part of 1948 saw dramatic im provements in the B-36 .

Even the early -A and -B models

could carry more bombs further than any other aircraft , and
the improvements in the jet- powered B- 360 promised even
further advances in the future .
Th e Return of General LeMay
While the B- 36 was proving itself to be far better
than expected , another development occurred which would
prove instrumental in the demise of the RB - 49 .

Following a

stint as Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe ,
Gen . Curtis E. LeMay was sel ected in October 1948 to s uc ceed
General Kenney as Commander of the Strategic Air Command .

A

strong believer in strategic reconnaissance , one of General
LeMay ' s top goals was to improve the quality of SAC ' s re .
conna1ssa
nce f orce . 9

When the RB-49 contract was let i n the summer of 1948,
the F lyi ng Wing did not have much competit ion as a recon naissance plane .

But by the time General LeMay took over

SAC in October , that had changed: the B- 36 , with its
defensive firepower, improv ing range and altitude, and newly
acq u ired speed , appeared to be a strong competitor .

Further
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damaging the RB-49's prospects was yet another stretchout in
delivery : RB-49, version III, which would have been the
first version to offer similar range as the B-36, was now
not expected to be ready for production until 1952 or 1953
(instead of the previous estimate of 1951), which would put
it in direct competition with what was expected to be a
superior airplane , Boeing ' s B-5 2 , then in the design
stage .

10
Acting on General LeMay's wishes, General Cabell ,

Director of Intelligence, called for a conference to review,
again, the requirements for strategic reconnaissance air craft .

Officers representing the Air Staff, Air Proving

Ground, Air Materiel Command , and SAC assembled on November
12 , 1948 and released their recommendations three days
later .

Based on the improvements already shown by the B-36 ,

and based also on the projected figures for the jet-powered
modification , the Board recommended the B-36 as its first
choice ; second choice was a reconnaissance version of Boeing ' s new B-47 , short in range but designed to be air re fuelable ; another Boeing entry , the B- 54 (a bloated development of the B- 29/B- 50 series) was a distant third choice .
The RB-49 was not included at all .

Major General F . H.

Smith , Jr . testified to the House Armed Services Committee
in 1949 :
Between the summer of 1948 and the time of the reconnaissance meeting in November, a number of de velopments occurred which made the B- 49 series look
less promising in comparison with other air~lanes .
For one thing , the Air Staff felt less conf1dent
about the early avai lab ility of the B-49 as a bomber
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Its aer~dynamic design as a tailless airplane
caus~d 1t to ~aw and pitch . . . requiring a more
prec1se autop1lot than is needed for conventional
airplanes .
It had other shortcomings , such as l ack of arma ment .
Minor problems of this sort are usual in a
radically new design and undoubtedly could be overcome in time . . . [but] they were sufficient to
cause Air Materiel Command to recommend postponing
development . . . 1 ~ntil further flight tests had
been made . . . .
How could the RB - 49 be satisfactory in the summer of
1948 , and unsatisfactory just a few months later?

Part of

the answer lies in shortcomings of the RB-49- - the crash at
Muroc , instability, short range, poor armament--but the B- 36
had its share of such problems, and more .

Still, much was a

result of the B-36 ' s remarkable resurgence , specifically in
bomb - carrying ability , altitude, and range .

As General

Smith went on to explain to the House Armed Services Committee, the RB-49 wasn ' t bad , but the Air Force, SAC, and
General LeMay felt the B- 36/RB-36 was better :
The characteristics of an airplane cannot be
judged on an absol ute basis; they must be compared
with the characteristics of other airplanes expected
to be available at the same time . The shortcomings
of the RB-49 in themselves did not argue against
procurement of that airplane .
In the summer of
1948, they seemed acceptable because the [R]B-49
did not have much competition as a reconnaissance
airplane .
In the fall of 1948, the B- 36 had demonstrated outstanding performance capabilities and
was certainly superior to the current version of
the [R]B-49.
Future versions of the [R]B-49 would
not be available for several years , at which time
they would be in competition with ot£zr models , expected to be equally good or better .
Budgetary Limitations
The third strike against the RB-49 came not from the
Air Force, but rather from President Tr u man himself.

The
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problem stemmed r.ot from any doubts about the RB-49, but
instead reflected President Truman's desire to maintain a
"pay as you go, " deficit-free defense posture, especially in
time of peace:
As county judge, senator, and President, I consistently kept in mind the same sort of tax philosophy .
It w~s.a pay-as-you-go program, except in emergency
condltlons . . . . There is nothing sacred about
the pay-as-you-go idea so far as I am concerned,
except that it represents jhe soundest principle
of financing that I know. 1
In 1947 , the Air Force strength had stood at fortyeight combat groups.

By late 1948, amid the tension caused

by Soviet actions around Berlin, that number had been increased to fifty-nine, with an ultimate goal of seventy
fully-equipped combat units .

The contracts awarded in 1948

(including the contract to Northrop for thirty RB-49s) were
geared toward supporting this seventy-group force.

14

But despite the Berlin situation, President Truman
refused to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff budget proposals for Fiscal Year 1950 .

The Services' own estimate of
15
their needs for FY 1950 was 23 . 8 billion dollars.

President Truman, though, imposed a ceiling of 14.4 billion
dollars, or a little more than half the Services' desires . 16
work .

Clearly , the " pay- as - you-go " concept was at

In a letter , Defense Secretary James Forrestal summed

up the problem :
. . . Our biggest headache at the moment, of.c~urse,
is the budget . The President has set th~ celllng at
14 billion 4 against the pared down requlrements
that we put in of 16 billion 9.
I am frank to say,
however, that I have the greatest sympathy for him
because he is determined not to spend more than we
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make in taxes. 17 He is a hard money man if ever I
saw one . . . .
On December 9 , the Service secretaries and the Joint
Chiefs met with President Truman.

The President listened to

their arguments, but remained firm : 14.4 billion dollars was
to remain as the FY 1950 defense ceiling. 18

The impact

on the Air Force's seventy group expansion was devastating:
instead of building fro m fifty-nine to seventy groups in
FY 1950, suddenly the Air Force had to cut eleven units,
dropping from fifty-nine back to the original forty-eight
groups .

19

The impact was especially felt in the Strategic Air
Command .

SAC ' s long range bombers and reconnaissance craft

were expected to represent much of the previously projected
increase .

Now not only would that increase be forgone, but

SAC would likely have to share in the cutbacks of already
existing forces.

Forrestal expressed his concern in a

November 1948 memo, one of a series called " Points for the
President " :
Throughout my recent trip to Europe I was increasingly impressed by the fact that the only balance
that we have against the overwhelming manpower of
the Russians, and therefore the chief deterrent to
war , is the threat of the immediate retaliation
with the atomic bomb .
I have substantial misgivings that reduction of the potential of the Air
Force in the long range bombing field might be misunderstood both by the w~5ld at large and particularly by our only enemy .
Despite reservations as to the wisdom of the budget
cuts, the Air Force set to work to implement the force reductions .

With the new forty-eight-group ceiling, a number
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of programs , planned or in existence , would need to be cut
back .

To recommend exactly where adjustments should be

made, a group of top Air Force decision makers were called
together .

The group was called the Senior Officers Board .
Senior Officers Board

The first meeting of the Senior Officers Board began
on December 29 , 1948 .
members :

There were to be only four voting

Gen . Muir S . Fairchild, Air Force Vice Chief of

Staff; General McNarney, still Commander of Air Materiel
Command ; Lt . Gen . How.ard Craig, Deputy Chief of Staff ,
Materiel ; and Lt . Gen . Lauris Norstad , Deputy Chief of
Staff, Plans and Operations.

General Fairchild became ill ,

so General McNarney chaired the meeting . 21

The main

witness at th i s first Seni or Officers Board was the new SAC
Commander, General LeMay , supported by members of his staff .
At the meeting , he asked for the ability to restructure his
force , eliminating some purchases whil e increasi ng others .
His desires were simple : more and better-equipped B-36s.
buy thirty-nine additional B-36s , some as bombers and some
as reconnaissance planes , and to mod i fy (specifically , add
jets to) ninety-four of the original B- 36s would cost
$269 , 761 , 000 . 22

General LeMay explained his desires for

the B- 36 to the House Armed Services Committee in 1949 :
COMMITTEE COUNSEL : And the reason that you so advocated the procurement of these additional B- 36 air planes, will you state that briefly to this committee?
GENERAL LEMAY : I now r epresent the people who flew
our bombe rs in the la s t war . Some of them are still

To
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around in the Air Force . They are the ones who are
going to fly the bomber missions if you call on us
a~a i n.to fight .
It is my job to know what they
l~ke ~n the way of equipment and what they can do
Wlth lt . . . . We have a requirements committee
that is constantly making recommendations to me on
equipment . They made a recommendation to me that
the B-36 was the best possible airplane that we
could procure to do our job, and I agreed with
them, and I made that recommendatio2 to the Senior
Officers Board and it was approved . 3
To get his B-36 bombers and RB-36 reconnaissance aircraft , General LeMay offered to forgo other aircraft purchases .

Among the airplanes deemed expendable were

Northrop's RB-49s .

As General Smith explained :

General LeMay . . . testified that an increase of
two groups of B-36 bombers (at the expense of two
medium [Boeing B- 50] bomb groups) and a strategic
reconnaissance group of RB-36s (in lieu of the
RB-49 type) would greatly enhance his ability to
launch a strategic offensive . The board approved
this recommendation and recommended that the funds
made available by any cancellations be devoted to
implementing ~he recommendations of the Strategic
2
Air Command.
To raise the $269 , 761,000 needed for the B-36/RB-36
purchases , the first Senior Officers Board recommended cancellation of six separate weapon systems involving four corporations .

It should be noted that Convair suffered some

loss, although far less than the others .

It must also be

noted that North American, not Northrop , suffered by far the
.
1 osses : 25
h eavlest
MANUFACTURER
North American
North American
Northrop
Northrop
Kellett
Convair

AIRCRAFT
B- 45
F-93
RB-49
C-125
H-10
YT-32

NUMBER
51
118
30
30
10
1

AMOUNT OF CANCELLATION
$105,300,000
57,930,000
88,500,000
8,940 , 000
6,831 , 000
2 , 260 , 000
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On January 11, 1949 , the recommendations of the Senior
Officers Board were implemented.

A telegram from Air Mater-

iel Command to Northrop formally cancelled the production of
the RB-49 :
In anticipation of receipt of formal termination
notice, the contractor is directed to stop all
work authorized . . . with the exception of the
engineering, fabrication, and flighi test applicable to the YRB - 49A airplane . . . . 6
The last part of the cancellation notice is most
significant .

Contrary to the claims made by reporter Clete

Roberts , that the planes, " each and every last one of them, "
were ordered scrapped by the Air Force , we can see here that
the YRB-49 test program was ordered continued .

On May 4,

1950, more than a year after the cancellation and just after
the ground accident that destroyed the only surviving YB-49
bomber, the YRB-49 made its first flight from Hawthorne to
Edwards Air Force Base

27

where the Air Force intended to

use it as an experimental vehicle :
This airplane will be used as a photo reconnaissance prototype .
It is planned to accomplish such
flight tests as are necessary to evaluate the airplane . . . after which tests the airplane will be
turned over to the Photographic Laboratory for
testing n ew photographic equipment und~r hig~ 8 speed ,
high altitude conditions . Tota l quant1ty -1.
Epilog
The re s t of the history of the single YRB - 49 is murky,
much of it lost due to incomplete Air Force records after
the cancellation .

Following the ground accident which de -

stroyed the sole surviving YB-49 on March 15 , 1950, the sixengine YRB-49 became the last exist i ng full - si z e Flying
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wing.

After its maiden flight on May 4, 1950, the YRB-49

entered flight test as planned, only to encounter stability
problems similar to those which had plagued its bomber
predecessors .

It was flown to Ontario, California, where a

stability augmentation system was to be installed .

Once

again, funding was apparently cut and the last of the big
Flying Wings was relegated to outside storage in the grape
vineyards surrounding the Ontario airport .

In October 1953 ,

nearly five years after t he cancellation of the RB-49
production program, Air Force crews from nearby Norton Air
Force Base cut up the YRB-49 for scrap .
the large Flying Wings wa s gone .

29

The last of
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CHAPTER VII
RESPONSES TO MR . NORTHROP ' S STATEMENT: SENIOR AIR FORCE
LEADERSHIP AND CURRENT NORTHROP MANAGEMENT
In the previous chapters, we have seen that the
written h i storical record points toward a variety of competitive, technical, and economic considerations which
worked against the procurement of the Flying Wings.

But Mr .

Northrop in the 1980 interview said that those factors were
not the causes of the cancellation .

Instead , according to

Mr . Northrop and his former chairman , Mr . Millar, the cancellations grew directly from their refusal to merge their
corporation with Convair, as they claimed Mr . Symington
demanded.

We have seen Mr . Northrop's account :

MR. NORTHROP : I got a telephone call a few days
later from Mr . Symington . He said , " I am cancelling all your Flying Wing aircraft . " And I
said , "Oh , Mr . Secretary, why? " And he said, " I've
had an adverse report , " and hung up . That was the
last time I ever talked to him, and the last time
we could ever reach him by phone or any other way .
ROBERTS: Did he give the contract to someone else?
MR . NORTHROP: He continued the construction of the
B-36 by Consolidated Vultee in Fort Worth .
ROBERTS: So , in fact, the contract was taken away
from you, and given to Consolidated because you had
refused to merge with Consolidated as you were ordered to do by the government, is that accurate?
.

MR . NORTHROP: That is absolutely accurate .
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We have also seen that in the same broadcast, Mr .
Millar confirmed the hostile tone of the meeting :
MR. ROBERTS : Mr . Millar , did you fear reprisal?
MR. MILLAR : Yes . . . . the meeting with Mr .
Symington was so, shall I say, brutal . . . barefaced . . . so obviously, if you will, a power play
that you almost had to assume that he would be prepared to take further st2ps if we didn't go as good
boys and go along . . . .
In my research , I have taken Mr . Northrop's and Mr .
Millar ' s statements, and have attempted to find evidence
that would either corroborate or refute them .

This chapter

first looks at the senior Air Force leadership of that day,
to get their perspective .

In gathering information for this

portion , I interviewed Sen . Stuart Symington , both by
telephone and at his horne in New Canaan, Connecticut; Gen .
Curtis E . LeMay, former Commander of the Strategic Air
Command and Air Force Chief of Staff, at his horne in Newport
Beach, California; Gen . Lauris Norstad, former Deputy Chief
of Staff for Plans and Operations, and the only surviving
member of the 1949 Senior Officers Board, by telephone from
his horne near Tucson, Arizona; and finally Gen . Elwood P .
Quesada, former Commander of the Tactical Air Command and
former chief of the Federal Aviation Administration,
interviewed at the United States Air Force Academy .
In addition to the perspectives provided by the former
Air Force leaders, this chapter also includes statements by
the current Northrop Corporation's top executive.

Thomas V.

Jones, Northrop ' s Chairman of the Board, contacted me by
telephone specifically to c larify the position of today ' s
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Northrop management.
Several questions form the structure of this chapter:
1.

Did the meeting take place as Mr . Northrop and Mr.

Millar describe?
2.

Did Mr. Symington discuss a possible merger with

Northrop and Convair representatives?
3.

In discussing such a merger, did Mr . Symington

give Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar reason to fear repr i sal if
the merger was not carried out?
4.

Even if Mr . Symington had wanted to cause damage

to Northrop by cancelling the Flying Wing, was he in a position to do so?
5.

Did Northrop and its Flying Wing get a fair

trial?
The answe r s to these questions will go a long way
toward destroying some of the myths surrounding the Flying
Wing ' s demise .
Question One : Did the meeting take place as
Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar describe?
We saw in Chapter I that Mr. Northrop described the
momentous meeting this way :
The same day that General McNarney . . . came to my
office with that additiona l order for thirty-five
airplanes . . . Mr. Millar and I were requested to
visit Mr . Symington . At that meeting, he lectured
u s rather lengthily on the difficulties of a Secretary for Air in keeping things in hand, and told us
that he did not want to spo nsor any new aircraft
companies entering the business and having to be
supplied with business o v er the years , and that he
wanted us without question to merge with Consoli dated Vultee , which was then operating a governmentowned plant in Fort Worth, building the B-36 · · · ·
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Afte: th~ lengthy diatribe on Mr . Symington's part,
I sa1d, Mr . Secretary, what are the alternatives
to thi~ demand you'r~ making of our merger with
Consol1dated Vultee?
And he said, "Alternatives?
You'll be goddamned sorry if you don ' t ! "
General McNarney said, "Oh, Mr. Secretary, you
don't ~ean that the way it sounds," a~d Mr. Symington sa1d, "You ' re damned right I do. "
There is no doubt that the meeting took place .

Mr .

Northrop testified to it in the 1949 House Armed services
Committee hearings, as did Floyd Odlum of Convair and
General F . H. Smith, Jr . , who delivered the Air Force's
statement.

4

But apparently Mr . Northrop's statement as

to who demanded the meeting was incorrect: the person who
instigated the meeting was not Mr. Symington, but Mr .
Northrop himself .

To work out the confusion caused by

General McNarney's letter concerning movement of RB-49
production to Fort Worth , Mr. Northrop had asked for
clarification .

According to General Smith ' s testimony ,

In response to General McNarney ' s suggestion, Consolidated held initial conferences with Northrop
officials . . . on July 9 , 1948. On the same date
Northrop notified General McNarney that in the preliminary meetings with Consolidated, several points
had arisen which needed clarification . . . . Early
action by Air Materiel Command was requested.
Mr. Northrop followed up his letter with a verbal request fo r a round - table discussion . . . .
In
response to this request, General McNarney and Gen.
K. B . Wolfe of Air Materiel Command went to Los
Angeles on July 15, 1948 . . . . At the time of
this conference , the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr.
Symington , was on the west coast to fi l l a long
standing engagem5nt to be the principal speaker at
a dinner . . . .
Mr. Northrop , in his own 1949 testimony , confirmed that it
was he who asked for the meeting:
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we suggested a meeting of the principals involved
wherein the questions concerning the production '
could be resolved . That meeting was h5ld in Los
Angeles on the 16th day of July . . . .
These statements must cause at least some skepticism
regarding Mr . Northrop's claim that Mr. Symington demanded
the meeting, presumably so he could order the Northrop/
convair merger .

But here we see that Mr. Northrop himself

asked for the meeting .

If Mr . Symington really intended to

improperly force Northrop to accede to a merger, would it be
logical for him to wait until Mr . Northrop got around to
asking to get together?

Even more disturbing is the coinci-

dence of the speaking engagement: were Mr. Symington not
already committed to be on the west coast, he most likely
would not have been involved at all.

These facts would

certainly seem to argue against any premeditated conspiracy
between Mr . Symington and Convair.
In 1983 , Mr . Symington could not recall the Los
Angeles meeting .

Thus , he did not recall who asked for the

conference, and was "almost certain " it was held in his
office at the Pentagon .

7

Question Two: Did Mr . Symington discuss a possibl e
merger with Northrop and Convair representatives?
The answer to this is a probable "yes ."

We have

already seen the testimony of General Smith in which he said
that at the July 16, 1948 meeting ,
Mr . Odlum suggested a merger . . . ~s the best ~ay
of combini ng the Northrop engineer1ng talent w1t~
Consolidated's production know-how . The sugge~t1on 8
seemed reasonable to the Air Force representat1ves .
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Since Mr. Symingto n was the leading "Air Force representative," at least at part of the meeting , it seems reasonable to assume he took part in the discussions .

Inter-

viewed in 1982 , Senator Symington could clearly recall discussing the Flying Wing with Mr. Northrop, but was not sure
exactly when or where the conversation took place .

A

possible merger might very well have been discussed :
The Air Force Chief [General Vandenberg, Chief of
Staff] wanted the B-3 6 and it was up to me to get
it . Now you know, of course , that there was a
tremendous amount of overcapacity in the industry
following World War II.
It was clear that many of
the smaller companies would not survive . Northrop
carne to see me , and said that unless he received
his Flying Wing orders, his company would be in
serious trouble .
I knew at that time that the Air
Force favored the B-36, built by Convair . I may
very well have suggested that he merge his company
with Convair , who we knew was going to get business.
I may have suggested he go see Dutch Kindleberger
at North American, or Bill Allen at Boeing . What
I ' m saying is t hi s: I may very well have suggested
Northrop talk with Convair about a merger .
I 'm
quite certain, though, that I never would have
9
discussed such a merger with Floyd Odlum .
Question Thre e: In discussing such a merger, did Mr .
Symington give Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar reason to
fear reprisal if the merger was not carried out?
Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar have made their statements; Senator Symington has no recollec tion of ever saying
anything that could have been construed by Mr. Northrop and
Mr. Millar as a threat .

But even if one were to assume he

did make such a comment , there seem to be at least two
possible interpretations.

Th e fir s t is that of Mr. Northrop

and Mr . Millar: that they were being forced to merge ,
against their will, with a competitor .

The second
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interpretation is equally plausible, and much more innocent .
Since Mr. Symington apparently knew from Mr. Northrop that
his compa ny could be in trouble without the RB-49 order, and
since he knew also that Convair would be getting more
business, the statement could be construed as a fair assessment of the post- war aircraft manufacturer situation: only
the strongest would survive, and the likely result of
Northrop ' s remaining s ma l l and ind ependent would be
bankruptcy.
In the absence of proof , one has to look at tendencies.

Would it have been out of character for Mr . Symington

to have indicated that Mr . Northrop would "be goddamned
sorry " if he didn ' t merge?

Gen . Elwood P . Quesada , a long

time associate of Senator Symington, a former head of the
Federal Aviation Administration and now Board Chairman of
L ' Enfant Plaza complex in Washington, D.C . , had this to say :
I've known Senator Symington a long while, and I
know of a number of occasions where he , like others ,
could have enriched himself at the public expense .
He never did, never even was interested .
At the same time, though , it would be completely
in character for him to blow his top and yell at
someb ody , even something like the " You ' ll be damned
sorry if you don ' t ," remar~ · He ' s got somethi n g of
a temper , you know . . . .
Gen . Curtis LeMay painted a similar picture of Senator
Symington, that of a volatile man who was inclined sometimes
to act on a problem first, and think about it later :
I remember for some time a big argument was going on
with the Navy about the B-36 . . . . The Navy had a
new jet fighter then , they said it could s~oot [the
B-36] down . . . the Banshee, they called 1t . · ·
and we were discussing that with Symington~ wh;ther
a fighter could shoot down a bomber .
I sa1d , Yeah ,
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a.fighter can shoot a bomber down, sure it can . Any
f1ghter can shoot any bomber down, if it's as fast .
But i t may not be conducive to long life and happiness. The only way to prove it is to put the B-36
and the Banshee up and to fight it out . " So, Symington then comes out with a statement that we would
fight out a battle with real bullets with the Banshee and the B-~6 . . . . ¥e was like that, things
I never could f1gure out . 1
Even accepting the possibility that

Mr. Symington made a

statement that implied that Northrop would regre t a failure
to merge , it seems to be almost certain that such a statement was not intended as a threat .
Interviewed in 1983, Senator Symington called " preposterous and absurd " the idea that he would threaten a firm
in an open meeting , with many others present :
If there ' s one thing I learned in all my years in
government, it's that it's impossible to keep a
secret. You ' ve got twenty people working for you,
and they each go home and tell twenty people, and
pretty soon it ' s all over town. It may take a
while , but yoy can't keep a thing like that a
2
secret . . . .
Still another factor which must be considered is the
presence of General McNarney.

A long-time aide to Gen .

George Marshall, General McNarney was a man of high integrity, and a man who main tained a very formal relationship
with Mr . Symington .

According to Senator Symington, this

was especially true because of a situation the previous
year , when Air Force Chief of Staff " Tooey " Spaatz came to
the Secretary of the Air Force to announce his intention to
retire.

General Spaatz asked for Mr. Symington's opinion on

a successor , but Mr. Symington declined, saying he felt it
was a military decision, best left for military men.
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Together, Spaatz and Symington took the case to General
Eisenhower , then advisor to the Joint Chiefs of staff.
Eisenhower studied the records of the two main candidates,
Generals McNarney and Vandenberg, and chose Vandenberg ,
based on his strong combat r ecord .

From then on, according

to Senator Symington, General McNarney maintained a distant,
formal relationship, perhaps surmising that Mr . Symington
was r esponsl'bl e f or h'~s non-se 1 ectlon . 13
°

With this in mind, we see that the conference of July
16, 1948 , did not contain a great many of Mr . Symington's
friends : Convair representatives may have been neutral , but
Northrop people blamed him (indirectly at least) for the
transfer of production to Fort Worth, and his one organiza tional ally , General McNarney , felt that the Secretary was
responsible for his passover.

Does it seem log ical that Mr.

Symington would choose this environment to make an improper
demand on Northrop?
And if for some reason he had made the demand, why
would General McNarney remain silent ?

Even Mr . Northrop did

not blame General McNarney , who supposedly said, " Mr . Secretary , you don ' t mean that the way it sounds," when Mr .
Symington was alleged to have made the "You ' ll be goddamned
sorry if you don't ! " comment .

Are we to believe that the

late General McN arney , too, was part of the conspiracy to
harm Northrop?

If not , wouldn't he have spoken up?

Skeptics will point out that General McNarney went on to
work for Convair , but that was after his retirement, almost
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two years later .

Several of the people involved absolutely

reject the idea that General McNarney would allow himself to
be entangled in anything that even approached unethical
behavior .

Senator Symington, despite the coolness that

developed after General McNarney was not selected as Chief
of Staff , says :
General McNarney was a right arm for Gen . George
Marshall during World War II, a brilliant man of
spotless integrity . Any implication that for
personal reasons he would be " biaf~d " to a supplier
is an insult to a great American.
General Quesada echoed the same sentiments:
Joe McNarney was the straightest of the straight
arrows, a real gentleman .
If the world were fair,
he would have been Air Force Chief of Staff, and he
should have been . But he'd been shunted into staffs
jobs instead of command positions in World War II.
And Gen . Lauris Norstad, the sole surviving member of Gen eral McNarney ' s Senior Officers Board , said:
I knew him well . There was never a better disciplined officer , a mo re straight-laced officer than
Joe MI~arney .
There's no skullduggery involved
here .
So we can see that a merger was discussed , and Mr .
Symington most likely took part in that discussion , largely
because he happened to be in the Los Angeles area at the
time .

We have seen that , according to his close associates ,

it would not be inconceivable for him to make a remark of
the general tone described by Mr . Northrop and Mr . Millar .
But at the same time , even were the comment made, it would
appear extremely unlikely that Secretary Symington was
threatening Northrop , for seve ral reasons .

First , that he

was even there was pure coincidence, since Mr . Northrop was
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the one who asked for the meeting, at a time in which Mr .
Symington happened to be in Los Angeles .

second, the

meeting was a fairly open affair with at least six (and
perhaps as many as a dozen) people present , few of whom were
especially friendly to Mr . Symington.

Finally, improper

behavior would necessarily implicate General McNarney, who
not even Mr . Northrop implied was in any way unethical .
Question Four: Even if Mr. Sy mington had wanted to cause
damage to Northrop by cancelling the Flying Wing,
was he in a position to do so?
Perhaps surprisingly , the answer to this is almost
certainly " no " .

Determination of military requirements --

such as which airplane to buy--was not part of the Secretary's job .

According to Senator Symington, when he took

over the Secretary ' s position, he made clear to the Air
Force Chief of Staff , General Spaatz, that he could offer
two things to the fledgling Air Force .

First was his

business experience : as pres i dent of a number of corporations , including Emerson Electric, Mr . Symington could
provide a unique and needed perspective to Air Force
decision making .

Second , Mr. Symington could push for Air

Force requirements on Capitol Hill.

But the determination

of those requirements was the responsibility of the military
Air Force Chief and his staff, not the Secretary of the Air
Force . 17

Specifically , Senator Symington denied ever

cancelling the Flying wing or any other aircraft that had
been recommended by the Air Force Chief:
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Not once, as Assistant Secretary of War for Air or
later as Se~retary of the Air Force, did I ever'
cancel a~ alrcraft that had been recommended to me
by the Alr Force.
If any recommendation to purchase the Flyi~g Wing had re~ghed my desk, I would
have approved lt. None did .
Senator Symington's contention that he always approved
the military-developed recommendations may seem a bit
disingenuous.

It certainly was not believed by at least one

aircraft manufacturer, who tried to influence the Secretary
to buy a particular bomber in 1948.

When Mr. Symington

demurred, citing the fact that such a decision was not his
to make, the manufacturer brought in a powerful Senator to
help argue his case, this time to both Mr . Symington and
General Vandenberg .

It was General Vandenberg who con-

firmed that the decision was a military one, and that the
. 1 ane h a d b een, an d wou ld contlnue
.
.
d . 19
alrp
to b e, re)ecte
We have seen already that the procurement decision
process in the Air Force moved from the bottom to the top,
as in the case of the B-36: General LeMay's staff made recommendations to him, and he in turn made recommendations to
the Senior Officers Board.

The Senior Officers Board made

recommendations to the Chief of Staff, with final ratifica tion by the Secretary of the Air Force.

This means that

even if the Secretary wanted to affect a decision , there
were but two practical avenues open : first, he could modify
a recommendation made to him by the Chief; second, he
could try to tamper with the process further down the line ,
at the level of the using commmand , in this case, the
Strategic Air Command .
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Two perspectives on this show that Mr . Symington
apparently did neither .

Gen. Lauris Norstad was Deputy

chief of Staff for Plans and Operations dur ing Mr . Symington's tenure as Secretary; he is also the only surviving
member of the 1949 Senior Officers Board which approved
General LeMay's request for more B- 36s in lieu of the Flying
Wings .

His statements support Mr . Symington completely :

Mr. Symington never pressured me or any senior
officers of the Air Force.
It was my position to
make recommendations and I did . Generally, he
accepted my recommendations . Sometimes he asked
for more information . But never, never did he
suggest we change our requirements , or go with a
different airplane, or a different company . All of
this was in my bailiwick, because my job was to
develop requirements, and the B- 36 was the only airplane , then or for the foreseeable uture, that
coul d meet the requirements . . . .

20

And General Norstad confirmed the bottom- up nature of the
procurement process .

Talking about Mr . Symington :

In no way did he ever generate requirements . Those
came from Te, and they came to me from the using
2
commands .
If there was no pressure on the senior officers of the
Air Staff , it seems then that the using command, SAC, would
be the next logical place to examine .

But Gen . Curtis

LeMay , then Commander of the Strategic Air Command, denies
ever receiving pressure from Mr . Symington or anyone else,
regarding the Flying Wing or the B-36:
No, I got no pressure on any particular airpla~2·
Wouldn ' t have paid any attention to it anyway.
Regarding why he opted for the B-36 in lieu of the
Flying Wings, General LeMay indicated that it was simply
that the B- 36 was the only airplane that could do the job he
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needed to do:
I don't remember ever having any choice in the
matter .
The B- 36 was it , and what we were pushing .
I do~'t think [the Flying Wings] were even in the
runn1.ng . · · ·
[The B-36] wasn't the best airplane
in the world , no . We did have a lot of troubles
w~th it , tro~ble with the gunnery system , trouble
w1.t~ the eng1.nes , exhaust stacks kept burning out
o n 1.t , but we were able to keep it in the air . . . .
We finally hung some more jet engines on the airplane , got more altitude out of it , better performance . . . so that during its life i t furnished us
with a weapo~ 3 system that would have done the job
a t the time .
Question Five : Did Northrop and its Flying Wing
get an unbiased trial?
The answer is almost certainly "yes" .

In a 1982

interview , Senator Symington indicated that not only did he
have nothing against Northrop, but that in 1951, two years
after the cancellation, he saved Northrop fr om bankruptcy :
But here ' s the real irony . The President in 1 951
asked me to go straighten out some problems in the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation . Shortly after
getting to the RFC, some . . . RFC people came to
see me with a recommendation that we call in some
RFC loans Northrop had.
I'm quite sure that would
have bankrupted No rthrop at th e time . I decided
instead that we should have one of our people put on
the Northrop Board of Directors .
I contacted Northrop , and suggested they accept James Allen on their
Board .
They didn ' t like that, but I told them it
was that or we called the RFC loans . Jim Allen got
on the board . Several years later , after To~ J~~es
took over at Northrop, those loans were repa1.d.
General Norstad said that in his opinion , the charge of Mr.
Nor throp and Mr. Millar had
utterly no basis and I'd swear it was incorrect . · · ·
There wa s no sk ullduggery involved . _I knew 2 ~ll the
cast of characters , and it ' s inconce1.vable .
Genera l Quesada also disregards the claims .

Asked if he did

not believe Mr . Northrop's story, he re s ponded :
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I believe Mr. Northrop was an old man, not, from
what I have heard, entir?~Y well. No, I don't believe it for an instant .
General LeMay similarly professed disbelief .

While express-

ing some skepticism about politicians in general, he tended
to attribute the problems to a clash of personalities:
Well, I'm kind of a pessimistic guy : all these politicians have a lower order of moral value than I
think they should have but I don't think this would
have been tried by anyone . . . .
I don ' t believe any of it. Mr. Northrop , maybe
he did believe it, but I don't think anybody gets
mad at any particular company that's got something
to sell to the armed services. You may not like
what they sell, and you don't buy it, but to go and
be vindictive about it after you've refused their
product , no . You ' ve too many other things to do to
start fiddling around with that . You ' ve got too
much to think about with the successful guy, to make
sure he gets out a product that meets your expectations . .
There may have been hard feelings between Northrop and Symington.
I could understand that. Symington wasn't the most likeable guy in the world . . 27
I never knew exactly what he was thinking . . . .
Comments of Current Northrop Management
We have seen the statements of the Air Force leaders
involved in the cancellation decision .

Those statements

unanimously tend to support Mr . Symington's position, and to
refute the allegations of Mr. Northrop and Mr . Millar.
Skeptics will point out that such solidarity among the
Air Force participants may not be altogether surprising .
After all, the reputation of the organization to which all
of these men have devoted the major part of their lives was
under fire .

wouldn't it be possible , one might ask, for

these men--either together or separately, consciously or
subconsciously- -to distort the circumstances surrounding the
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Flying Wing cancellation ?
In consideration of these arguments, r tried on a
number of occasions to elicit a response from officials of
today ' s Northrop Corporation .

My efforts were, for a long

time , unsuccessful : even people who had helped me on
previous projects were unable to cooperate on the Flying
Wing story .
Then , shortly before the completion of this dissertation , I was contacted by Mr . Thomas V. Jones , past President
and now Chairman of the Board of Northrop Corporation .

Mr.

Jones explained that he had instructed Northrop employees to
refrain from comment because he believed that none of his
current people could possibly know the real truth behind the
1949 cancellation .

Mr . Jones explained that, in his ex-

perience, any cancellation brings forth strong emotional
reactions in those people associated with the terminated
project .

The Flying Wings were certainly no exception, and

Mr. Jones did not want his people making pub l ic statements
based on such emotionally- charged beliefs .

He went on to

point out that no one currently in his firm, himself ineluded, is in a position to comment on the specifics of Mr .
Northrop ' s charge :
This was in the past , and none of us now involved
in the Corporation were t here . . . .
I have no
direct knowledge, nor do any of our peo~le ~gve any
knowledge , of what caused the cancellat~on .
But if Mr . Jones has no specific knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation thirty-five years
ago , he does have strong feelings about the man accused by
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hl.·s firm ' s founder .

Accordl.'ng toM r . J ones, he has never

had any reason to doubt the integrity of Stuart Symington,
despite Mr. Northrop's allegations:
I have been a friend , a close friend of Stu
.
'
Sym1.ngton for a long time . Stu ' s record stands on
its own .
He has always been upstanding and fair
in his dealings with us , and I have no reason to
believe he wasn ' t upstanding and fair in this [the
Flying Wing] case.
I would serve as a character
witness for him any day, but as far as the specifics of [the cancellation] are concerned , r can
give no testimony . Or , rather, I guess you ' d say
my testimony would be inadmissable .
I have spent
a lot of time thinking how I could do something to
ease the hurt that this thing has 2~used Stu, but
I really don ' t know what I can do .
Summary
Like any investigator, one has to assess two factors:
motive and opportunity .

Did Mr. Symington have the motive

to cancel the thirty RB-49s?

And if he did, was it in his

power to do so?
It seems that the answer to both questions is " no" .
As far as motive , no one wil l probably ever satisfy the
backers of John Northrop that there was not some arrangement, some under-the-table deal, between Mr. Symington and
Convair .

Mr . Northrop ' s backers will point to the alleged

threat and see not a burst of temper, but a deeper and far
more sinister conspiracy.

The opinions of men like Generals

LeMay , Norstad , and Quesada--even with the support offered
by Northrop ' s Thomas Jones - -will not convince skeptics that
Mr . Symington is not guilty.
But the second half of the problem, that of opportunity , must make the most skeptical observer pause .

Not only
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does Senator Symington claim that he let military men make
military decisions, but his statement is backed up by all
the military men who were most involved in those decisions.
At the House Armed Services Committee hearings in
1949, Mr . Symington responded to a Committee member who had
made charges of corruption, while at the same time making
full use of Congressional immunity :
. . . It did no t make any difference to the Air
Force , or to me about the attacks which have been
made against our intelligence . It is very possible
that we might have bought this airplane [the B- 36],
and I believe in it , and been wrong, but when people
say that the entire High Command of the Air Force is
dishonest--and if that is true, it means a mass conspiracy or ~gthing- - I take very bitter exception to
that . . . .
The situation is the same today .

To disbelieve

Senator Symington is to accept the idea that the whole top
leadership of the Air Force at that time was either hoodwinked by a corrupt few , or all involved in a conspiracy to
boost Convair at Northrop's expense .

If one does not accept

one of those premises , and the additional premise that the
surviving leaders are still carrying on the deception, one
has to harbor serious doubts about Mr. Northrop's interpretation of the cancellation .
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Chapter VII Footnotes
1

"The Flying Wing--What Happened to It?" There
are a few problems here .
First, Mr . Northrop said he got
the call cancelling the Wings "a few days" after he turned
down Convair's merger offer . But we know from testimony
before the 1949 House Armed Services Committee by Major
General F . H. Smith, Jr ., Mr . Northrop , and others that
Northrop de~lined to merge on July 16, 1948, preferring the
subcontract1ng arrangement for building the RB-49 at Fort
Worth .
But the cancellation occurred in January of 1949,
six months later . The passing of six months, not just a
" few days , " would seem to blunt the cause-and-effect relationship between the merger breakdown and the cancellation
suggested by Mr . Northrop.
Also , Mr . Northrop says he could never again contact
secretary Symington.
In a May 25, 1983 letter to the
author, Mr . Symington wrote, "That is absurd .
I was always
available to the head of any aviation company. " Later in
this chapter we will see where Mr . Symington, as head of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, contacted Northrop Air craft Corporation in 195 1.
In a 1983 interview, Mr .
Symington believed that he spoke then with Mr . Northrop
himself, but could not recall that with certainty .
2

Ibid.

3 Ibid .
4General Smith testimony , pp . 69 - 70; John K.
Northrop testimony, pp . 281-283; Floyd B. Odlum, testimony
before House Armed Services Committee, Investigation of the
B- 36 Bomber Program , pp . 625 - 626 .
5 General Smith testimony, pp . 69 - 70 .
6 John K. Northrop testimony, p . 277.
7 senator Stuart Symington to the author ; letter ;
May 20, 1983 .
8 General Smith testimony, p . 70 .
9 senator Stuart Symington ; telephone interview;
November 17 , 1982 . On October 25, 1982 , Senator Sym~ngton
had been contacted by the Acting Director of the Nat1onal ,
Air and Space Museum (NASM) , who had asked for the S~nator s
comments on a section of a book scheduled to be publlshed
by the Museum .
Since the proposed text tended to support
Mr . Northrop's charges (e.g . , "According to Jack Northrc;>p,
considerable pressure was brought to bear on him by Symlngton
to merge with Convair.") , Senator Symington responded
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vigorously and quickly . In a November 4 letter {copies of
which went to current Northrop Chairman Thomas v. Jones and
to the author) , he chal lenged Mr . Northrop's recollections
and criticized the NASM for believing them . NASM subse- '
quently changed the text: see followup letter, Senator
Symington to Mr . Walter Boyne, Acting Director, National
Air and Space Museum; January 7, 1983 .
10

Gen . Elwood P . Quesada {USAF, Retired) , interviewed by the author at the United States Air Force Academy,
Colorado ; April 7, 1983 .
11Gen. Curt1s
. E . LeMay {USAF , Retired), interviewed by
the author at Newport Beach , California ; September 29 , 1982.
12 senator Stuart Symington, interviewed by the author
at New Canaan , Connecticut; June 6, 1 983 .
13

rbid.

14 senator Symington letter , May 20 , 1983 .

15 General Quesada i nterview .
16 Gen. Lauris Norstad {USAF, Retired), telephone interview ; January 31 , 1983 .
17 Senator Symington interview .
18 senator Symington telephone interview .
letter to Mr . Boyne, November 4, 1982 .

See also his

He.w~uld.not ~erm~t
the disgruntl ed manufacturer to be ident1f1ed 1n th1s dlsser tation , except to say that it was not Mr. Northrop.
19 senator Symington interview .

20 General Norstad telephone interview .
21

rbid.

22 General LeMay interview .
23

Ibid .

24 senator Symington telephone interview .
his letter to Mr . Boyne, November 4, 1982.

25 General Norstad te lephone interview .
26 General Quesada interview.
27

.
General LeMay interv1ew .

See also
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28 Thomas V. Jones , Chairman of the Board of Northrop
corporation, telephone interview ; November 4 , 1983 .
29 rbid .
30 secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington , testimony before House Armed Services Committee, Investigation of
the B-36 Bomber Program, p. 242 .

CHAPTER VIII
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE FLYING WINGS:
THE AIR FORCE PERSPECTIVE
We have seen, then, that political chicanery was
apparently not a significant factor in the demise of the
Flying Wing.

Rather , the dec is ion to cancel the thirty

RB- 49s resulted largely from the interaction of three devel opments, all in late 1948 : the dramatic improvement of the
competing B- 36 , the arrival of General LeMay as Commander of
SAC, and President Truman ' s slashing of the Fiscal Year 1950
defense budget .
The significance of these three factors should not be
especially controversial .

The B- 36 proved itself throughout

the 1950 ' s as SAC ' s first-line bomber , until finally supplanted by the B-52 in early 1959 .

1

It was far from a

perfect aircraft , but as Gene ra l LeMay po in ted out earlier ,
it would have done the job at the time .

Likewise, the

effect of General LeMay's arrival at SAC is clear : far more
than his predecessor , General Kenney, he believed in the
B- 36 , and was willing to give up other systems, like the
RB-49, to get it .

Finally, the effect of President Truman's

budget cuts is undeniable : instead of continuing its buildup
from forty-eight through fifty - nine to seventy groups, the
newly established Air Force had to r everse course , dropping
102
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back to forty-eight combat units.

The airplanes that would

have provided the backbone of the enlarged force became
expendable .
There exists , however, a fourth dimension to the
problem, perhaps not as significant as the three main
factors , but far more controversial.

That dimension con-

cerns the technical performance of the Flying Wing .

was it

a safe , effective aircraft design , capable of playing a useful role in America's strategic deterrent force?

Or was the

Flying Wing an unproven experiment , hazardous and not very
useful, and unfit for routine operation?
To answer these questions from the Air Force's perspective, I went to the experts .

For questions concerning

aircraft stability and flying characteristics , the two primary Air Force test pilots for the YB-49 were most helpful .
On questions of utility- - i . e . , could the Flying Wings do the
jobs that needed to be done?--General LeMay's insights were
most informative .

The beliefs and comments of these men go

a long way toward explaining more of the real reasons for
the cancellation of the Flying Wing.
Stability and Flight Characteristics
No aspect of the Flying Wing story has generated more
disagreement and contention than the question of the aircraft ' s stability .

we have seen, for example, that while

the Nor throp people rated the stall characteristics of the
YB- 49 acceptable, at least one of the Air Force pilots who
died in the 1948 crash was reluctant to even attempt the
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stalls scheduled on the day of the fatal accident .
Not surprisingly , J ohn Northrop was convinced of the
stability of the Flying Wing bombers .

In a May, 1947 speech

before the Royal Aeronaut i cal Society , he said :
The second basic.requirement is that the all-wing
aeroplane be d~s~gned to have sufficient stability
and controllablllty for practical operation as a
military or commercial aeroplane . We believe this
requirement has been fully met by hundreds of
flig~ts compl~ted with.thi~ type, and ~e are fully
conv1nced of 1ts pract1cab1 l ity . . . .
Northrop ' s engineers were equally convinced of the
Flying Wing ' s stability .

D. G. McNeal , who by 1980 was

Northrop's Advanced Aircraft Production Group manager, said
of his involvement with t h e Wing : "We believed in it . . . .
No questions ." 3

Hugo R. Pink, later manager of

Northrop ' s Test and Eval uation Group , was more reserved , but
still confident :
The airplane needed a stabi l ity a ugmenter , and o ne
was being developed and was quite successful before
the program was cancelled. So the problem the air plane had , had been solved . And , of course , with
the eq~ipment we have today , it wou l d be " duck
soup. "
It was not on l y the engineers at Northrop who believed
in the Flying Wing ' s performance : Northrop's test pilot, Max
Stanley , was a believer as well .

For KCET reporter Roberts ,

Mr . Stanley outlined his opinions about the Flying Wing:
I flew the Flying Wing , both the B-35 and the B~49,
f r om the first flight of each airp l ane through 1ts
entire program and I felt that the airplanes c~uld
be described as normal airplanes . . . no spec1al
skills were nee ded , and I tho ught it was just a
very fine flying machine . . · ·
. .
.
.
The airplane ~ somewhat def~c1ent 1~ dlrec tional stability . However , the Mlnneapolls- Honey wel l peo ple developed what we called "Little Herbert" ,
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a stability ~ugmentation system , that
·
corrected th1s problem . . . . J
essentlally
So the picture painted by the Northrop people is one
of a generally acceptable aircraft with only minor stability
problems , and even th ose were solved by the "Little Herbert"
system .

But a study of the Air Force pilots ' opinions will

provide a very different viewpoint.
The Air Force Perspective
Retired Brig. Gen . Robert L. Cardenas was the primary
Air Force test pilot throughout most of the Flying Wing
bomb er development.

He had great affection for the YB-49 ,

and great respect for Mr . Northrop ' s genius, although the
YB -4 9 has continued to affect his life in ways not always
positive .

In a 1983 letter to the author, General Cardenas

wrote :
I was the Air Force test pilot on the XB- 35 and the
YB-49,-a5 well as the forerunner , the N-9M . I have
also been hounded and badgered by dozens of magazine , book , and history writers for ever 30 years ,
who have all tried to unravel the "Wing " mystery .
They have all had an axe to g6ind, some pro-Northrop,
some pro- civilian government .
What did Gene ra l Cardenas think about the stability of
the YB-49?

In the KCET-TV interview , he told Mr . Roberts :

I ' ve got to make clear that I never said it was unstable .
It was marginally stable - -stable, not un stable--about the vertical 'xis, or yaw, and about
the lateral axis , or pitch.
What about the Northrop contention that a stability
augmenta t ion device had already solved those problems?
First , "Little Herbert " only took care of the yaw problems,
not the tendency to pitch up and down .

8

Further ,
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"Little Herbert" was too primitive; better systems needed to
be developed :
The R & D [resear~h and development] program would
have had to be.orl.ent~d .towards the development
of w~at " now ~x1.sts, d1.g1tal flight control, "flyby-wl.re , .wh1.ch was not capable of being developed
at that t1me . In other words, Mr . Northrop had a
beautiful concept that w~s probably twenty years
ahead of its time . . . .
So , General Cardenas appears to side with Northrop's
Mr . Pink, who sa id that with today's equipment, the solving of the YB-49's stability problem would be "duck soup" .
But the po int is really moot : to critique a 1949 decision,
using information based on aeronautical developments of the
1970 ' s, is a pointless exercise .

As General Cardenas point-

ed out in his 1983 letter:
I must also remind you that this was a decade . . .
that , pushed to the wall by World War I I , had taken
us from low sub-sonic propeller aircraft to jets to
super - sonic rocket a irc raft - -all in te n years! Put
yourself in . . . that timeframe when we had the
engines , the airframes , and the guts to fly all
those products of a beautiful era--but no electronic
" fly-by-wire" flight control systems! Today the
[General Dynamics] F- 16 was designed unstable to
allow it to jerk square corners , but it has the type
o f co£ rol system in the 80's that we needed in the
40's .

0

Another Pilot ' s View
In April 1949 , three months after the cancellation of
the RB-49 order , then-Major Cardenas was replaced as the Air
Force's chief Flying wing pilot .

The new pilot, also an Air

Force major, was Russ Schleeh , who had been the eyewitness
11
to the first YB - 49 crash less than a year before .
Then- Major schleeh remained the chief YB- 49 test pilot

107

until he was badly injured in the crash of the only remaining YB-49 on March 15, 1950 .

Like General Cardenas, Colonel

schleeh was a strong backer of the Flying Wing, despite its
problems :
There is no question that the Flying Wing . . . was
a tremendous accomplishment and was responsible for
many firsts .
I think it was most unfortunate that
the B-49.pr~gram was not kept as a development program unt1} 2 1ts numerous problems could have been
resolved .
What , according to Colonel Schleeh, were the "numerous
problems " that needed to be solved?
tant , was stability.

First, and most impor-

In the KCET - TV interview, Colonel

Schleeh ' s comments on stability were brief: " From

a sta-

bility standpoint , it still needed further development. " 13
In a 1983 interview , Colonel Schleeh elaborated:
In rough air , because it was so short- coupled, any
kind of gust would make the nose pitch way up , or
way down .
A modern stability augmenter would have
taken care of that , but "Little Herbert" only controlled some of the yaw, none of the pitch . It 1 ~rob
ably wasn ' t dangerous, just real uncomfortable .
More serious problems affected the YB-49 in stalls:
I never did an official stall program , just one or
two to satisfy my curiosity. But a stall was not
a pleasant maneuver, and you ran into all kinds of
problems .
Because it had no vertical surfaces , it
would fall off to one side or the other as you approached the stall . As you ' d go sideways, at about
40 degrees of crossflow , it would then whip over into a spin , which itself was a ter ri fi c l~ t tle surprise.
. .
It was not an acceptable a1rplane ,
period. 15
From the standpoint of stability and performance,
then, it appears that both Air Force pilots harbored serious
doubts about the YB-49, and t hat those doubts were never resolved .

Both pilots are of the opinion that , given enough
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time and money, the problems could have been solved .

But as

to how much time, how much money would have been needed, no
one can ever know .

And h ad the stability prob le ms been

solved, would the B-49 series have been successful?

Colonel

schleeh thinks not :
Probably most of the B-49 ' s deficiencies could have
~een corrected ; but even so , it is my opinion that
1t would not have b~en competitive with the jet
bombers of that per1od . . . . The aerodynamics of
the YB-49, which were basica lly those of a 400 mph
airplane designed for piston engine performance,
could not compete with the aerodynam ics gf an aircraft designed for jet-age pe r formance . 1
Another Debate : Performance as
a Bombing Platform
As with the issue of stability , the performance of the
Flying Wing as a bomber is a controversial issue .

We saw in

Chapter IV that when flown in competition with the B-29 ,
bomb runs took four times as l ong with the YB - 49, and accuracy was only half as good .

Why , then , did reporter Clete

Roberts s ay that the YB-49 had p roven itself as the successor to the B-2 9?

Max Stanley backed up the claim that

the YB-49 had been deemed by the Air Force to be a suitable
bomber:
I think when you talk abou t the a i rplane be~ng ~
suitable bombing platform , you should keep 1n m1nd
that it wa s subjected to a very intense seri~s of
tests to determine its s ui tability as a bomb1ng
platform.
It was flown by the Northrop pilots a~d
the military pilots and the concl~sion was that 1t l7
was a suitable bombing platform, 1t ~ acceptable .
But once again , the Ai r Force viewpoint is different.
General Cardenas flew the first Air Force bomb runs with t h e
YB-49 in l ate 1948; hi s bombardier was a Major Williams, who
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gave this account of the first tests , all done without an
autopilot :
An experienced bombardier who has dropped a great
d~al.of bom~s from.this airplane would have a very

dlfflcult tlme maklng a satisfactory bomb run in
less than four minutes. On no two occasions were
the altitude and airspeed constant during the
bombing runs.
It is impossible to keep the bubbles
on the bombsight level, nor is it possible to
synchronize the rate and turn knobs due to the
yawing and pitching of the aircraft . On several
occasions the bombs were released while the airplane was in a skid and t£g . . . error (was]
approximately 3 ,00 0 feet .
His phraseology may have been awkward, but Major
Williams certainly got his point across .

He went on to ex-

plain that the B- 29 drops under identical conditions were
twice as accurate , while requiring only about one-fourth the
time on the bomb run.

The pilot, Major Cardenas, went on to

make five specific recommendations, all of them involving
significant changes to the aircraft .

The first change

recommended by Major Cardenas involved installation of a
"satisfactory autopilot . "

19

So "Little Herbert" was installed.

A new series of

tests to evaluate the YB - 49's bombing ability was conducted
in April and June 1949, by which time Major Cardenas had
been replaced as chief test pilot by Major Schleeh :
During the months of April and Jun~ in 1949~ I flew
the airplane eleven times, evaluatlng.the alrcraft
as a bombing platform both with and wlthout the 20
autopilot. The bombing results were very poor .
While " Little Herbert " had helped the yawing behavior,
the YB-49 still had its problem of pitching up and down .
. was exacerbated by the tendency of the bombs, shown
Th ls
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clearly in photos taken from a chase plane, to themselves
pitch and tumble before leaving the bomb bay . 21

Exactly

what caused the poor accuracy remained a mystery to Colonel
Schleeh :
I never really knew what exactly caused the inaccuracy7
Norma l ly, you get better accuracy with
an autop1lot than you do by flying manually, but
not in this case : We could bomb ~anually as well
as we could with the autopilot. 2
But what of Max Stanley ' s claim that after intensive
tests , the Air Force declared the YB-49 an " acceptable "
bombing platform?

None of the Air Force records I could

locate supported this contention : in no case was the YB- 49
ever deemed acceptable in its then - current configuration .
Colonel Schleeh, when asked about the YB-49 ' s acceptability
as a bomber , was adamant :
I never said i t was acceptable , and none of us who
flew bombers and knew bombing ever said it was an
acceptable bombing platform . You could drop a
bomb with it, but it wasn ' t ~3arly as good as the
other airplanes of that day .
Another Perspective : Performance from
the Use r' s Point of View
When General LeMay assessed the Strategic Air
Command ' s strength in late 1948, he saw that existing war
plans relied heavily on forward staging bases: the relatively short ranges of the B-29 and B-50 left no other choice .
But he was reluctant to continue to rely on the foreign
bases , for at least two reasons .

First , foreign leaders

could always deny SAC permission to use the facilities .
Second , the closer the bases were to the Soviet Union, the
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more vulnerable they were to attack . 24
Thus, General LeMay started to restructure SAC based
on a single , primary principle : "the fundamental goal of the
Air Force should be the creation of a strategic atomic
striking force capable of striking any target in Eurasia
from bases in the United States and returning to the points
25
of takeoff."
Interviewed in 1982, General LeMay reaffirmed his rationale:
Well , our most likely enemy was the Soviet Union .
As I remember, this was before we had NATO so our
possible bases were limited, or really unknown, so
we wouldn ' t know what we might have . We might have
had to go there from here . Anyway, we needed ~6
long- ranged an airplane as we could get . . . .
Once this line of r easoning had been accepted within
SAC , all hope for the Flying Wing was gone .

There were

only two ways to get the range General LeMay wanted .

The

first was to build the range into the airplane , by including
cavernous fuel tanks in the wings and fus el age ; this was the
principle used in the B-36.

The second method, just becom-

ing practical in the years around 1950, involved aerial re fueling , in which a '' tanker " aircraft would replenish the
bomber's fuel supply in flight; this was the principle
behind Boeing ' s B-47, and virtually every other military
aircraft since .
But the Flying Wing was incapable of utilizing either
approach .

With an empty weight only a bit more than half

that of the B-36, it was too small to compete with the B-36
in self-contained fuel .

It had been designed before air

refueling was practical, so it could not compete with the
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short-ranged but refuelable B-47.

Even had it been possible

to add air refueling capability, the B-49 ' s tendency to
pitch up and down would have made it an unlikely prospect
for the delicate duet which needs to take place between a
refueling tanke r and bomber .
Interviewed in 1982, General LeMay confirmed that all
these factors worked against the B-49 series .

He similarly

dismissed the current comments that the Wing ' s shape makes
it an ideal "stealth" airplane, since the absence of sharp
corners and vertical surfaces reduce the reflection of radar
energy : at that time, he said, the generally accepted counter to radar was to fly higher .

Only after the downing of

Gary Powers' U-2 in 1960 did the strategy of "the higher,
the better " come into doubt.

In addition,

looking back on it now, this thing had control
problems, and they said it had to be a thick wing,
so we would never have gotten the performance out
of it . We ' d gone to thick wings before . . . . We
never would have ~ot supersonic with an airplane of
2
that sort . . . .
Looking back, did he , like the test pilots, wish that the
program had been kept alive?

No, not really:

Of course , you ' ve got to go back and try to put
yourself into what we knew, what th~ sta~e o~ the
art was at the time . . . but I don t th ln~ lt [t~e
canc2~lation] was a bad decision even look1ng at lt
now .
Conclusion
It is to be expected that the Air Force participants
in the Flying Wing story have a much different perspective
than their Northrop counterparts .

But two things are clear.
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The first is that the Flying Wing has to be viewed as a
complete system .

To say, as the Northrop people do, that

the YB-49 was a great airplane except for the stability
problem is a bit like saying that the mythical Icarus was a
great flier, except for this minor difficulty with overheating.

A similar situation exists with the Wing's

capacity as a bomber .

An otherwise great aviation achieve-

ment appears to have been hampered by practical, basic
considerations: no one wanted a bomber that couldn't bomb,
or one that couldn ' t reach its targets.
The second point that seems clear, though, is that the
Air Force people involved in the Flying Wing project shared
the affection and pride of their Northrop associates.

While

General Cardenas and Colonel Schleeh feel strongly that the
YB-49 was in no way ready for full - scale production , both
men expressed regret that the developmental test program was
halted.

General Cardenas, who himself tended to believe Mr.

Northrop's charges, expressed a fatalistic trust tha t the
Flying Wing will return :
What ' s done is done, and it should remain done .
Why resurrect old ghosts? Let new technology and
new aircraft design orove the point of efficacy of
f t. 2'.::1
.
.
W1ng-type
a1rcra
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CHAPTER IX
"THE FLYING WING--WHAT HAPPENED TO IT? ":
A CRITICAL REVIEW
In this chapter, I will analyze essential portions of
the KCET-TV documentary "The Flying Wing--What Happened to
It?" in an attempt to clarify certain aspects of the cancellation decision .

In so doing, I am returning to the origin

of my own involvement , because it was this documentary which
sparked my study of the entire Flying Wing program .
When ''The Flying Wing--What Happened to It? " was aired
in December , 1980, I was a staff officer in the Strategic
Air Command , working on a number of bomber improvement programs , most involving the aging B-52 .

The show immediately

captured my attention : if Mr . Northrop, Mr . Millar and Mr .
Roberts were right (as I then believed they were), a corrupt
and unethical decision had apparently shaped the course of
aviation development, especially bomber development , for
perhaps the rest of the century .

Certainly the charges de-

served to be explored more fully than could be done in a
brief half- hour documentary.

I believed then that a deeper

investigation, especia l ly one that looked at the Air Force
side of the controversy , would prove worthwhile .
That , then , was the context in which this investigation was begun .

Obviously, my findings as detailed in the
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previous chapters have led me to conclude that my original
beliefs were wrong.

In reaching that conclusion, I have

also come to believe that the KCET documentary was exceptionally incomplete and inaccurate .

Some of the inaccur-

acies were errors of omission: for example, Mr. Roberts
neglected to even mention the devastating effects of President Truman's budget cuts, nor did he address the improvement of the competing B- 36 .

Also not discussed were the

meetings of the Senior Officers Board just prior to the
cancellation , and the desire of SAC and its Commander,
General LeMay , to acquire the B-36 .

Other negative aspects

of the Flying Wing , like the Forbes/Edwards crash, and the
YB-49's short range , and its doubtful in-flight stability,
were either glossed over or not mentioned at all .
Other inaccuracies in the documentary clearly grew
from the frailty of human memory.

Some errors were not

terribly significant : for example , Mr . Northrop forcefully
described getting the order for thirty-five airplanes, but
the order was really for thirty.

He also referred to a

fatal crash in the B-35 program, but the only such crash of
the full-size Wings involved not the B-35 but the Forbes/
Edwards YB- 49.

In other areas , though, the effects of Mr .

Northrop ' s apparently flawed recollections are more important : for example, we have seen his claim that the fateful
July 1948 meeting was ordered by the Air Force , while the
records show convincingly that the instigator of the meeting was Mr. Northrop himself .
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If the only errors in "The Flying Wing--What Happened
t o It ?" were the afo remen t·loned flaws of omission and memory, one could probably not be too cr 1·t 1·cal .

Af ter all, Mr.

Roberts closed his "expose" Wl· th something of a disclaimer,
acknowledging that "one has the feeling that only the surface has been scratched in the story of the B-49 ' Flying
Wing . ' "

1

But there are other flaws in the documentary,

flaws far more serious than the omissions and misrecollections cited above .

The purpose of this chapter is to use

several of the more dubious statements in the KCET show as a
framewo r k for spotlighting some of the misconceptions about
the whole Flying Wing situation .
"Editoria l Fairness " and Senator Symington's
Real Response
In " The Flying Wing- -What Happened to I t? " it appeared
that Senator Symington was offered a chance to make an oncamera rebuttal to the charges against him, and that he
elected not to do so .

In explaining the Senator's non-

participation, KCET showed an exceptional l y unf l attering
photograph of the Senator , while Mr . Roberts narrated the
following :
The villain in the death and destruction of the B-49
Fl ying Wing, according to John Northrop and ~ichard
Millar , would be the then-Secretary of the Alr Force
Stuart Symington . Editorial fairness dema~ds ~hat Mr .
Symington tell his side of the story at th1s t1me .
We invited him to do so. Speaking to us only t~rough
his secretary , the former Air Force civ~lia~ ch1ef _
said that he ' never did that sorz of thlng, and de
clined to appear in this report .
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But did he really decline to appear?
senator Symington, he was never asked .

According to

In a 1982 telephone

interview, he explained that while he then lived in New
canaan, Connecticut, he still maintained a Washington, D.C .
office, staffed by his long-time secretary .

According to

Senator Symington , his secretary received a call from California asking for his comment on Mr . Northrop's allegations
regarding the Flying Wing cancellation .

She apparently re-

plied that " the Senator never did that sort of thing, " but
would get a message to him .

But the message seemed unimpor-

tant to Senator Symington, so he disregarded it :
I live in New Canaan, Connecticut. I keep an office
in New York, and this one in Washington , but I'm
rarely here . Somebody from California called, but
the message didn ' t make any sense to me . I was a
Senator for twenty- four years: weird message3 come
in all the time. I never returned the call .
Thus , what may simply have been a secretary ' s loyal
defense of her long- time boss was represented as an unwillingness on the part of the Senator to respond .

The viewer

was left with the clear impression that Senator Symington
was either afraid or unwilling to risk a confrontation with
his accusers.

But that was apparently not the case: in a

later interview , he confirmed that he was not even aware of
Mr . Northrop ' s charges until long after the KCET show was
aired . 4
The Purported Destruction of "Every Last
One" of the Flying Wings
One aspect of the cancellation is pointed to by
Northrop supporters , more than any ot h er , to "prove" the Air
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Force's vindictiveness : the complete destruction of all the
Flying Wings supposedly ordered by the Air Force.

Reporter

Clete Roberts gave new voice to the charges in the KCET
broadcast:
[S)uddenly the contracts for the Flying Wings
were cancelled . The aircraft themselves, every last
one of them , were ordered destroyed, and the order
came from the U.S . government . And they were des troyed, each and every one of them . 5
---The simple fact is that Mr . Roberts was wrong .

True,

orders were given to scrap most of the planes at the
Hawthorne plant , but even that permitted two of the giant
Wings to survive .

We have seen that the surviving YB-49

continued to fly until it crashed on March 15, 1950, more
than a year after the cancellation; we have seen also that
the lone YRB- 49 did not make its first flight until May 4,
1950, and that it survived until late 1953 , when it was
apparently scrapped as an abandoned derelict at Ontario ,
California.
Mr . Millar gave a similar , but somewhat more accurate,
account.

Note that he did not say that all the Wings were

ordered destroyed , only those seven still on the Northrop
ramp:
As part of the cancellation, instructions were issued
to destroy the seven airplanes on the a~ron of the
plant . Those airplanes were destroyed 1n front of
the employees and everybody who had their heart and
soul in them . No reason was given .
.No,explanation was forthcoming ~s to why they d1dn t save
at least one or two . . · ·
But of course two - -the YB-49 and YRB-49--~ saved .
And while it was unfortunate that the seven airplanes were
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scrapped in the presence of those who had built them, was
there a better alternative?

On February 25 , 1949 , the Air

Force estimated that the dismantling of the seven planes
still at Northrop would save $7 , 500 , 000 , compared to the
7
cost of making them flyable .
Should the Air Force have
spent those millions to make the Wings flyable , so they
cou l d be dismantled at some other location?

Rather

obviously, the decision was an economic one : the Air Force
could not justify spending any more money (beyond that which
was to be spent on the continued t ests of the YB-49 and
YRB- 49) on a project that had finally reached a dead end .
Museum Pieces
In his documentary, Mr . Roberts pointed out that the
Air Force's destruction of the Wings was so complete that
even the two major aviation museums in the United States
don't have any :
. And they were destroyed , each and every one
of them . There-rs-no example of the B-49 Fly ing
Wing in t he Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson
Air Force Base, nor is t§ere an example in the
Smithsonian Institution .
Of course there is no B- 49 in the museums : only two
were built and they both crashed .

(The first prototype

Flying Wing , the N-lM, did survive and is now being restored
by the Smithsonian; one of the three larger N- 9M scale
models still exists , and is being rebuilt by a museum in
Chino, California.

Neither of these was apparently deemed

worthy of mention i n the KCET documentary.)

But is the fact

that t he f ull-s i zed Wings were not saved by the Air Force
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Museum significant?
We have seen earlier that at least seven aircraft
types, including the RB-49, were cancelled by the Senior
Officers Board in early 1949 : North American•s B-45 and
F-93; Northrop •s C-125 and RB-49; Consol i dated•s YT- 32 ;
Kellett • s H- 10; and Boeing • s B/RB- 54 . 9

Of those air-

craft , only one was already operational --the B-45-- and it
is the only one on display in the Air Force Museum today .
All the rest were cancelled before going to their using
commands; none of them is represented at the Museum . 10
Thus , the fact that no Flying Wing is in the Air Force
Museum cannot be construed as a sign of the Air Force•s vindictiveness .

The current director explained to the author

in 1981 that the Museum emphasis has always been on operational Air Force aircraft, rather than on unique and interesting evolutionary cul-de-sacs; as he bluntly put it,
uWe 1 re not runnlng
•
a frea k s h ow h ere . u11

What the Decision-Makers Knew
In retrospect, with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight,
the decision to scrap the Wings at the Northrop plant certainly appears regrettable .

But before condemning those who

issued the destruction orders, we must try to put ourselves
in their position .

Studies in August of 1948 had estimated

· 1Y 11 pickle 11 (i · e .,
the cost of the cheapest option--to slmp
preserve) and store the planes Unt ;l their problems could be
k

fixed--would be $2,500 ,0 00 . 12

Further, to make the air-

craft flyable would cost $7 , 50 0 , 00 0 ·

13

The decision-
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makers knew that the YB-49 was in flight test, and that the
YRB-49 assembly and flight test would continue.

With this

information , we can see that the decision to scrap the airplanes was not vindictive or malevolent : if the Air Force
leaders really wanted to destroy the Flying Wings, wouldn't
they have destroyed the YB- 49 at Edwards and the YRB-49 at
Hawthorne?

Would they have allowed the YB-49's subsequent

appearance at a 1949 Washington air show?

And would they

have allowed the YRB-49 to be completed and entered into a
new flight test program in 1950?

Should we blame the 1949

decision-makers for the 1950 crash of the remaining YB-49,
and for the 1953 destruction of the abandoned YRB-49?
The answers to these questions are obvious , and the
conclusion to be drawn is obvious as well : the decision to
destroy the Flying Wings at the Northrop plant appears
tragic, viewed from our perspective thirty-f i ve years later .
But when we analyze the decision from a 1949 vantage point,
it becomes clear that the chosen course of action was the
logical and cost-effective one at the time.
A Suitable Replacement for the B-29?
In describing the Flying Wing in the opening minutes
of the KCET broadcast , Mr . Roberts stated:
[The YB-49] was the product of the genius of John
K. Northrop and his crew of engineers , who ~ad
brought it to a point of development where ~t had
been selected by the United States Air Force as the
next generation bomber , the replacemen~ for the 14
B-29 which had carried the air war aga~nst Japan.

124

My research yielded not one bit of evidence that would
support this statement .

We have seen General Arnold's tes-

timony, in which he explained how the ten-thousand-poundpayload/ten-thousand-mile- range airplane was the logical
successor to the B-29 .

And it is true that the XB-35 and

XB- 36 were ordered with the expectation (or at least the
hope) that at least one of them would prove a suitable
successor t o the B- 29 .

But we have also s een that the XB-35

was a near-total failure , primarily due to the ill-conceived
propulsion system.
With the failure of the XB-35, the future of the Flying Wing bomber rested on the jet- powered conversion, the
much shorter-ranged YB-49 .

But we have seen that, like its

propeller-driven predecessor , the YB-49 suffered from its
share of problems .

Those problems have been detailed in

earlier parts of this dissertation , but the bottom line
deserves to be repeated : never was the YB-49 judged by the
Air Force to be a suitable bomber, and never was it
"selected by the United States Air Force as the next
generation bomber , the replacement for the B-29."
A "Flyoff " Against the B-36?
Also misrepresented in the KCET show was the idea that
there was a head-to-head competition between the YB-49 and
Convair's B-3 6 .

In Mr. Roberts' words:

[The YB- 49] flew in competition with thr~e aircraft,
the B- 36s, and it won the flyoff . · · ·
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Such a " flyoff " connotes a situation s1m1
· · 1ar to the
1970's "fly before you buy" concept, in which multiple manufacturers built aircraft to the same set of spec 1' £1ca
' t'1ons,
and then the competitive prototypes were flown on identical
missions to see which performed best. 16

But no such

situation existed with the B- 36 and the YB-49: performance
characteristics were completely different, the main discrepancies being in range and bomb capacity . The B-36 was
classed by SAC as a " heavy" bomber; 17 the YB-49 was a
"medium" bomber. 18

We have seen the B- 36 had a range

approaching ten thousand miles ; the YB-49 range was about
half of that .

We have seen also that the B-36 could carry

84,000 pounds of bombs; the YB- 49 couldn't come close to
that amount .
There was, of course, a kind of competition between
the B- 36 and the Flying Wings , but it was based solely on
budgetary, not performance-related, considerations.

In much

the same way that today's B- 1 competes against the M-X missile for scarce dol l ars, so the B- 49 series competed against
the B- 36 ; every dollar spent on the B-36 was a dollar unavailable for spending on the B-49 and other airplanes .

But

to claim that the YB-49 "won the flyoff " against the B- 36
suggests that both aircraft were capable of performing the
Strategic Air Command ' s mission and that the YB-49 was
simply judged to be better .
without foundation .

such a suggestion is totally
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Conclusion
There are other inaccuracies in "The Flying Wing-What Happened to It? " , less significant than the ones detailed above .

But what emerges from an analysis of the

show ' s errors is perhaps more disconcerting than the errors
themselves.

There are so many mistakes , so many omissions,

so many misleading statements, that the analyst is obliged
to ask : Just what was the purpose of the KCET broadcast?
was it a good- faith effort to allow an old and dying man to
express the beliefs he had held secretly for thirty-five
years?

Was it an attempt to ruin the reputation of a long-

time public servant?

Or was it something in between : an

effort, perhaps, to stir up a dormant controversy, in the
hope that the truth would finally emerge?
Whatever the purpose, it should be noted that the show
had the effect of severely , and unjustifiably, damaging the
reputation of Stuart Symington .

In a 1983 interview, he

expressed to the author his belief that the main thing he
had to leave behind him was his reputation , and that that
reputation had been unfairly and perhaps irretrievably
19
damaged by the KCET broadcast .
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CHAPTER X
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
This dissertation finds its meaning on two levels.

On

the surface , it is a detailed case study of an important
aircraft development program gone awry .

As such, it has

developed into a critique of the critics, and a defense of
the decision-makers who ended the Flying Wing program
thirty-five years ago .
The second level of meaning is deeper, more general,
and ultimately more important .

No matter how fascinating a

case study may be , it must ultimately derive its meaning
from its predictive ability, that is, how well the study
allows us to project its lessons into the future.

By know-

ing the lessons of the past, we can best put ourselves in
position to avoid their repetition .
Following , then , are some of the long-term lessons
that can be learned from the demise of the Flying Wings .
Importance of Marketing: Focus on the Customer
In his 1960 article , "The Marketing Revolution " '
Robert J . Keith discussed the primacy of the customer :
The consumer, not the company , is in the middle .
In today ' s economy the consumer, the man or womant
. at th e a.bsolute dead around
cen er
who buys the product, 1s
of the business universe. Compan1es reyo l ve
the customer, not the other way around .
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Mr . Keith went on to discuss what he saw as the four
eras that characterized the "marketing revolution" at his
firm, the Pillsbury Company .

The first era was production-

oriented, and consisted of the company ' s efforts to produce
those goods it could fabricate well, and then to find a
market in which to sell them .

Aft er evo 1v1ng
·
1
t1rough
a pair

of intermediate stages, Mr . Keith said that, in 1960, his
firm was on the brink of a fourth era, that of "marketing
control. "

In this stage , the facets of marketing--research,

product development, pricing, distribution, and the like-would dominate the firm . 2
Other authors have since argued for the primacy of the
customer, and thus of marketing .

In his classic, Manage-

ment : Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, Peter Drucker
emphasized that the most critical aspect of any business
enterprise is not engineering, or technology, or a specific
product .

Rather , the focus of a business must be the

customer, and the development and maintenance of that focus
is the purpose of marketing :
There is only one valid definition of business purpose : to create a customer . .
Because its purpose is to create a customer, the business ent7rprise has two- -and only these two - -basi~ fu~ct1ons:
marketing and innovation . . . . Market1ng . 1s the
distinguishing unique function of the bus1ness .. A
business is set apart from all other human organlzati~ns ~y the fact that it markets a product or a
serv1.ce .
Mr . Drucker went On t o emphasize that being a technological leader is never enough by itself : a successful
firm must remain customer-oriente d ·

His example is IBM,
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which used such a customer-orientation to leapfrog

over the

computer industry ' s technological pacesetters:
But while the technological leaders
computer days , Univac, GE , and RCA,
focused and technology-focused, the
salesmen who ran IBM asked : "Who is
What is value ~o r him? How does he
does he need? "

in the early
were productpunch card
the customer?
buy? And, what

In today ' s marketing-oriented business world, such
notions seem almost common-sense .

But our review of the

history of the Flying Wing program has revealed an almost
complete lack of the "customer focus " that Mr . Keith and Mr .
Drucker claimed to be so essential .
Northrop : A First- Era , Production- Oriented Firm
It seems clear in retrospect that Northrop was totally
oriented toward the product that it was uniquely capable of
developing, and was, at the same time, little concerned
about the needs of its customer .

Even the genesis of the

Flying Wing, as interpreted by pro-Northrop aviation author
Bill Gunston, reflected the firm ' s focus on product :
Of course, common sense shows that with small aircraft at least a rudimentary nacelle has to be re tained in order for the occupant(s) to sit upright . . . . For this and other reasons Northrop
decided his first saleable flying wing would have
to be very large. Indeed, it would have to be
either ~ big civil transport or a long-range
bomber .
Mr . Gunston went on to explain that the civil transport would definitely be harder to sell than the bomber : the
a1rlines were too cautious to 1nves
0

0

t

0

1n

such a radical and

costly venture, but the Air Corps had already proven to be
something of an easy mark :
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In 1941, the answer was obvious
The t ransport
would be much more d~ff~cult to do the re was no
obVlOU~ customer Wlth whom he could work and the
marketlng problem was
clearly formidable • Th e a1r°
l1nes are conservat1ve, and Northrop did not
1° h
the penalty of building the right product tenr~e~~s
too soon. On t~e other hand . . . the Army, having
poured out conslderable funds for such giant bombers as the [Boeing] XB-15 and [Douglas] XB-19
without havigg any clear idea why, was rather
eager .
0

0

0

•

0

,

0

0

If Northrop paid little attention to the customer ' s
needs at the outset , it paid even less as the project went
along .

We have seen that in every area that mattered to the

customer, the Strategic Air Command, the Flying Wings were
deficient.

They could not carry the types and quantities of

non - nuclear weapons necessary, and could not carry the early
atom i c bombs at a l l .

The i r ability to reach Eurasian tar-

gets was non - existent , since they had neither sufficient
internal fuel capacity nor in- flight refueling capability .
They were unable to deliver what bombs they could carry with
the required accuracy , and their in-flight stability was, at
best , doubtful .
In areas that d i d not matter much to SAC, the Wings
excelled .

The YB/YRB- 49s were fast, but speed without the

range to reach the target was a useless strength.

The Wings

were maneuverable , able to outfly some of the top-performing
fighters of that day .
not highly prized .

But this, too, was a characteristic

General Kenney testified in 19 4 9 that,

a s f ormer SAC Commander , h e dl dn, t care about maneuver.. 7
ability " because a bomber doesn ' t maneuver in combat .
o

General LeMay also downplayed its significance : as he put

it
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a 1982 interview , if SAC bo mb ers were called on to go to

the soviet Union, their aim would be to drop bombs, not
engage the Russians in dog fights .
matter to him at a11 . 8

Maneuverability did not

"Marketing Myopia"
How could a successful firm , led by such a brilliant
aircraft designer, fail so badly in the arenas of management
and marketing?

The answer may lie in the fact that the very

qualities that l ead to success in technology and engineering
can hamper performance in other critical areas .

In his 1960

artie le, "Marketing Myopia", Theodore Levitt described just
such a circumstance, in which engineering geniuses are
baffled by the inconsistencies of the marketplace :
Having created a successful company by making a
superior product, it is not surprising that management continues to be oriented toward the product
rather than the people who consume it . . . . A
number of other factors tend to strengthen and
sustain this belief :
1 . Because el ectronic products are highly complex and sophisticated, managements become top
heavy with engineers and scientists . This creates
a selective bias in f avo r of research and production at the expense of marketing . The organization
tends to view itself as making things rather than
satisfying customer needs . . . ·
.
.
2 . To this bias . . . is added the b1as 1n
favor of dealing with controllable variables . Engineers and scien tists are at home in the world of
.
9
concrete th1 ngs . . . .
If Mr. Northrop developed a bias toward controllable
variables , and one against the vagaries of the Ai r Force
procurement process, he could hardly be blamed .

The Air

Force certainly contribute d generously to the general
misdirection which characterized the Flying Wing 's
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mers cause :

Mr. Levitt described the problems that custo-

consumers are unpredictable varied f' kl
.
short- sighted , stubborn, and general,lylcb teh, stupld,
·
·
t h
o ersome
Th 1s J.S no w at the engineer-managers sa
b t d·
down in their consciousness it is what thy,
eeplO
ey bul.
e 1eve.
The Air Force was all that, and more.

consider just

these examples we have already seen : first, the desired
range for the XB-35 five thousand miles, then--in a phone
call-- it was abruptly doubled to ten thousand .

In May of

1948 , Northrop got its order for thirty RB-49s; the very
next month, production of twenty-nine of the thirty was
shifted to a competitor; six months later, all thirty were
cancelled .

In 1946, General Kenney had tried to cancel the

B-36; two years later, his successor gave up other aircraft,
including Northrop's, to raise money for more B- 36s.

Add to

these the problems caused by non- Air Force action--e . g.,
President Truman ' s FY 1950 budget cuts--and one can readily
sympathize with the "engineer-manager's " point of view .
Nonetheless, the research/engineering/production bias
certainly dominated Northrop's management of the Flying Wing
program .

For nearly ten years, the underlying theme of the

dialogue between Northrop and the Air Force is plain : the
Air Force continually expressed concern about the practical
features of the Wings - -range, bomb carriage and delivery,
in-flight stability, and production rates, to name just a
few .

The Northrop Aircraft Corporation's responses were

equally consistent: it continued to ignore, or at least
minimize, the Air Force's concerns, while trumpeting the
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wing ' s successful aspects--speed, maneuverability , and
aeronautical achievement .

Unfortunately for Northrop those

were facets which the customer , especially SAC and General
LeMay , valued little or not at all .
Marketing Planning
The well - known marketing authority, Philip Kotler, has
argued that effective marketing demands four major planning
11
skills .
Two of them-- pricing and distribution-- did
not play significant roles in the demise of the Flying
Wings .

The remaining two- - product development and promo-

tion- - were central to the program 's failure.
Product development--the need to develop an idea into
a commodity that customers will pay for- - has been covered
extensively in other parts of this dissertation .
factor, though - -promotion--has not.

The last

If we define promotion

as the need to reach a market and then to spur that market
to a desired action (i . e . , buy our product), we can see that
some of Northop's actions in that area are hard to explain .
Promotion presupposes , of course , that the firm knows what
its market i s , and that it stays in touch with that market
through some f o rm of f eedback system .

In 1949 , Mr. Northrop

testified that the RB - 4 9 cancellation was "a shock · · ·'
out of the b lue . n 12

But if he had been at all in touch

·
Wlth
his market, h e must have known th e Flying Wing was in
-3 6 in late 1948 was
trouble . The rapid improvement of t he B
13 The President ' s
well-documented in i ndustry sources .
proposed budget c ut s were also publicly reported , as was the
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replacement of General Kenney, no big fan of the 8 _36 , by
the pro-B-36 General LeMay .

Even the existence of the

senior Officers Board, before which General LeMay testified,
had been a poorly-kept secret in the industry .

According to

Aviation Week :
Airc~af~ ma~ufacturers

have been watching anxiously
for 1nd1cat1ons of what a small group of top USAF
generals have been up to for the past two weeks.
Generals Norstad, McNarney, Craig , and Fairch i ld
have been clos eted in t he Pentagon for top secret
meetings during thi 4 holidays . The subject--aircraft procurement .
Given this , how the news of the cancellation could
have come "o ut of the blue " to Mr. Northrop is not clear.
Rather , it would seem that a reasonab ly well-informed, marketing- oriented firm would have had at least some warning,
perhaps enough time to try to reawaken the customer to the
superior points of the Flying Wing .

But we will see that--

for whatever reason--this did not occur .
Promotion and Buyer Behavior
In even the largest organizations, buying is still a
function of individual behavior .

It follows, then, that a

fir m must target its marketing efforts toward the individual
decision- makers , not toward the monolithic organization . In
their artie le , "A General Model for Understanding Organizational Behavior ", Frederick Webster, Jr · and Yoram Wind
explained :
·
ro
The individual is at the center of the buy 1 n~ 0 P. cess .
It is the specific individual w =s
· · ·
.
£fort not the ab
the target for
the
market1ng et . s 1mportan
.'
t to
.
.
stract organ1zat1on · · · · 1 1
,
s chological
understand the organizational buyer s P Y
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characteristics and especially his red·
. .
preference structure, and decision Pm d llsposltlons ,
· f or mar k et1ng
·
o e 5as the
bas1s
strategy decisions.
So who was the individual at whom marketing efforts on
behalf of the Flying Wing should have been aimed?.

Certainly

not Mr. Symington : in addition to his claim that he let
military people make such decisions, we also have seen that
the decision - model for weapon system acquisition went from
the bottom up , not from the top down . 16
As General Norstad put it :
In no way did he [Mr . Symington] ever generate requirements . Those came fror 7 me, and they came to
me from the using commands .
So we've seen that the using command, in this case
SAC, determined aircraft requirements.

It follows, then,

that the using commander, General LeMay, should have been at
least one of the major targets for Northrop's marketing
effort .

But in his 1949 appearance before the House Armed

Services Committee , Mr . Northrop testified that he thought
he had discussed the Flying Wing with General LeMay, but at
least three years earlier , long before the General's assignment to SAc . 18

This is a difficult situation to under-

stand: in late 1948 and 1949, General LeMay held the key to
an $84,000,000 contract, and yet Mr. Northrop had not discussed it with him since 1946!

When he took over the

Strategic Air Command in october of 1948, might General
Mr. Northrop ' s
LeMay have had contact with other members Of
.
f 1rm
regarding the Flying Wing ?.

Interviewed in 1982,

General LeMay recalled no discussions with Northrop people
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about the Flying Wings.

In fact, he didn't even consider

the Wings to be among the viable contenders,

although thirty

of the reconnaissance models were already on order; perhaps
incredibly , General LeMay never once even~ the Flying
wings that Mr . Northrop wanted to see become the major
component of America ' s strategic reconnaissance force :
I don ' t think [the B - ~9] was even in the running,
[and] the - 35 wasn't 1n the picture at all . . . .
No , I never even saw t£9 things, just pictures over
the years , that's all.
So , Northrop ' s marketing efforts apparently did not
include discussing the product with the one man who had
greatest control over its fate .

Further, when he appeared

before the Senior Officers Board to argue for more B-36s at
the expense of the RB-49 order, General LeMay had no firsthand knowledge of the Northrop product .
Whether one places the responsibility for this lack of
dialogue on the manufacturer or on the Air Force, the simple
fact remains : the Flying Wings had no support from that most
critical quarter , the customer .
Summary
To understand the failure of the Flying Wi ng , one
should look not in the direction of political maneuvering or
unethical behavior , but rather toward the more prosaic
concepts of marketing .

A marketing- oriented firm would have

determined the needs of its customer, and then built a
being a technolproduct to fulfill those needs ; Northrop,
ped a product
ogically- orien ted enterprise , instead d eve 10
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based on its own unique capabilities , and then tried to find
a customer for that already-determined product .

When the

customer protested over a period of nearly ten years that
the product couldn't do the job that needed to be done, a
marketing-oriented firm would have at least paid attention;
Northrop pressed on, minimizing the importance of the flaws
while touting the Flying Wing ' s far less significant
strengths .

A marketing- oriented firm would have known that

in even the largest of organizations, buying decisions are
ultimately made by individuals, and it would have made
efforts to favorably influence those individuals; Northrop
did not, perhaps believing that the innovative characteristics of the Flying Wing were enough to make , and keep, the
sale.

Finally, a marketing-oriented firm would have

realized that a customer buys not so much a product as he
buys utility: the B-36 , for example, with its bulbous cockpit, ungainly fuselage, six pusher propellers and four
tacked-on jets, hardly qualified as a major aesthetic breakthrough , but the customer didn ' t care.

As General LeMay

said, it could do the job at the time.

Convair sold SAC not

the B-36 , but rather its capability and usefulness; Northrop
sold only the Flying Wing .
Toward the Future
Today, Northrop is again working on another Flying
Wing: the highly classified "stealth bomber.

.. 20

In

and
other ways, though, the corpora t ~;on is much different,
signs indicate that Northrop has learned much since the
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Flying Wing era of the 1940's .

Management is perhaps less

engineering-biased: the current chairman, an eng1neer
.
by
training, started with Northrop as a planner thirty years
ago , after leaving the Rand Corporation,· the current president is a manufacturing expert; his predecessor was a former
administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.21

In addition, areas that hampered the devel-

opment of the old Flying Wings have been addressed: a 1982
plant acquisition and other improvements valued at $200
million will avoid the capacity constraints that hurt the
22
firm in the past,
while advances in electronic flight
controls are expected to negate the problems of instability
which plagued the big bombers.

The most impoitant change,

though , is Northrop ' s development of a marketing- orientation : the stealth bomber is being developed not only because
Northrop knows how to build it , but also because the customer (once again the Air Force, specifically SAC) needs it.
Conclusion
In a 1978 article in the Journal of Marketing, Derek
Abell introduced the concept of "strategic windows" ·

He

suggested that the best time to push a product is when such
a "strategic window " is open, when there is a smooth meshing
between the needs of the customer and the peculiar strengths
of the producer :
.
., .
sed here to focus
The term " strategic w1.ndow l.S u
1 limited
attention on the fact tha~ there ~~~t~nb~tween the
periods of time during wh1.ch the
l.
rticular
key requirements of a market and the pa
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competenc~es o~ 3 a

firm competing in that market is

at an opt1mum .

Clearly such a strategic window did not exist in the
l940's , when both Northrop ' s still-developing technology and
the Air Force's changing requirements combined to doom the
Flying Wing bombers .

The situation today, though, promises

to be different: the demands of the customer seem in harmony
with the capabilities of the producer.

Thirty-five years

after the deaths of their graceful predecessors, the window
to success for the Flying Wings may at last be open.
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